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CHAPTER-I 
INTRODUCTION 
There has been a world-wide trend towards decentralization in recent 
years. Many countries have experienced devolution of administrative, political 
and fiscal responsibilities to lower levels of governments. Dissatisfaction with 
the prevailing centralized systems of service delivery, transition from 
centralized planning to market economy, deepening democratic principles and 
increasing need to recognize social, economic and political diversities in 
different regions within the countries are some of the important reasons cited 
for this phenomenon. This trend towards decentralization is seen in countries 
with federal as with unitary systems; it has spanned across countries with 
varying levels of development; it is seen as much m transitional countries and 
even military dictatorships as in democratic countries } 
The term decentralization is the process whereby authority is 
restructured between institutions of governance at the central, regional and 
local levels with power and functions transferred to the lowest institutional or 
social level that is capable of completing them. It involves devolving political 
power, defming people's role in the decision making, transfer of functions, 
devaluation of funds, making administrative arrangement for planning and 
implementation taxing powers and financial autonomy and so on.^  
The complex phenomenon of decentralization can be classified into 
three types: deconcentration, delegation and devolution. In deconcentration, the 
decision-making power with higher-level and the lower-level governments is 
merely employed to implement the higher level's policies and programmes. In 
delegation, the higher-level government delegates decision-making power to 
the lower level for specified functions. Only in devolution is decision-making 
power shared between the higher and lower levels of governments, so that 
genuine decentralization is evident.'' The process are classified broadly as 
political, administrative and fiscal decentralization. 
• Political decentralization: Transfers policy and legislative powers from 
central government to autonomous, lower-level assemblies and local 
councils that have been democratically elected by their constituencies. 
• Administrative decentralization: Places plannuig and implementation 
responsibility in the hands of locally situated civil servants and these local 
civil servants transfers the responsibility to elected local governments. 
• Fiscal decentralization: The transfer of financial resources and assets 
from the central administration to other levels of governments is called 
fiscal decentralization. Fiscal decentralization affects the revenue as well 
as expenditure side of the budget though the impact at local, level is 
generally much stronger on the expenditure side.'* 
It has been felt that decentralization of power to the local units of 
governance and management is one of the best ways of empowering people, 
promoting public participation, increasing efficiency and transparency. For 
instance, increased efficiency is because the decision makers who live locally 
to know more about local conditions, thus they should be able to match 
resources and needs more precisely. Decentralization of governance can help 
mobilize resources, introduce locally and regionally diverse solutions and 
promote equitable growth by bringing the poor into the mainstream of 
development. Fiscal decentralization is a sub-set of decentralization defined as 
fiscal empowerment of lower tiers of govermnent which involves the 
devolution of taxing and spending power along with the arrangements for 
rectifying mismatches in resources and responsibilities. It is perceived as an 
important means to enable efficient allocation of resources, improve 
governance, accelerate economic growth, reduce poverty, achieve greater 
gender equity and empower weaker sections of the society. Poverty reduction 
means designing, implementing and targeting appropriate methods to ensure 
that the scarce resources are allocated in such a way to get maximum impact on 
the poor and decrease their level of deprivation and vulnerability.^ 
1.2 Conceptual Framework: An International Scenario 
The pursuit of decentralization is wide spread, as both developed and 
developing countries attempt to challenge central government monopoly of 
decision making power. In the Western World, decentralization is an effective 
tool for re-organization of the government in order to provide public services 
cost effectively in the "post welfare state era". Developing countries are turning 
to decentralization to escape from the traps of ineffective and inefficient 
governance, macro economic instability and inadequate economic growth 
throughout post communist Central and Eastern Europe decentralization of the 
state is the direct result of the transition from socialist system to market 
economy and democracy.^  
The last two decades of the twentieth century witnessed a significant 
rise in the scope of local democracy throughout the developing and developed 
countries, with increasing devolution of political, economic and administrative 
authority to local governments. Along with privatization and deregulation, this 
shift represents a substantial reduction in the authority of national government 
over economic policy. The first wave of post-world war II thinking on 
decentralization, in the 1970s and 1980s, focussed on decentralizing 
hierarchical government structure and bureaucracies. The second wave of 
decentralization beginning in the mid 1980s, broadened the concept to include 
political power sharmg, democratization, and market liberalization, expanding 
the scope for private sector decision making. During the 1990s decentralization 
was seen as a way of opening governance to wider public participation through 
organizations of civil society.' During the 1970s and 1980s, globalization 
forced some governments to recognize the limitations and constraints of central 
economic planning and management. A shift during the same period in 
development theories and strategies in international aid agencies away from 
central economic planning and trickle-down theories of economic grovv1;h 
toward meeting basic human needs, growth with equity objectives and 
participatory development also led to increasing calls for decentralization. 
National govenmient decentralized in order to accelerate development, break 
bureaucratic bottlenecks arising from centralized government plaiming and 
management, and participate more effectively in a globalizing economy. By the 
mid 1980s with the continued weakening of centrally plarmed economies, the 
waning of the cold war, and the rapid growth of international trade and 
investment economies and political forces reshaped conventional concept of 
not only economic development but governance and decentralization as well.^  
In Latin America, the origin of decentralization is the political 
pressure from the public for democratization. In much of Africa calls for 
decentralization emanated from tribal minorities and economically peripheral 
ethnic groups. Growing discontent with the inability of cenfral government 
bureaucracies to deliver effectively almost any type of service to local areas 
fueled the decentralization movement in Africa. Calls for devolution or 
autonomous rule also came from minority group in Belgium, Quebec, Wales, 
Scot land, Malaysia, the Baltic countries, Mexico, the Philippmes, Yugoslavia, 
and the former Soviet Union that were dissatisfied with their political 
representation or allocation of national expenditure.^ Some governments 
decentralized under condition of fiscal instability, Argentina in the mid-1980 
and Brazil in the late-19 80. Countries like, India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Nigeria, 
China, Sri Lanka, Chile, which have adopted decentralization more vigorously 
in the last two decades, do not have any similarity of either the cause or the 
objective or the form. It has emerged due to their socio-economic and political 
factors that are more country specific than represent any general trend. Along 
with China has been accepted decentralization to promoting rural development 
and providing employment to local people. Tanzania's decentralization is being 
driven more by dissatisfaction with the quality of local public service, which 
has been attributed to too little expenditure discretion at the local government 
level. Pakistan has been adopted decentralization to alleviate some political-
market imperfections. Finally from Bolivia to Bulgaria, and from West Africa 
to South Asia, a wide variety of countries are increasing the authority of local 
governments and working to make them more responsive and effective.'° 
As we have seen that the prime motivations behind these reforms 
vary some counfries are emerging from dictatorships seeking to disperse power 
among smaller government units. Others are reducing the size of the central 
government as part of a transition to a more efficient market economy. Many 
others seek to increase public involvement and accountability in government 
decision making. Where one country is responding io donor pressures for 
popular reform, another is hoping that the poor performance of the national 
government can be overcome by allowing local government to provide 
ftindamentally local public services. In contrast, arguments against 
decentralization have focussed on the weakening the capacity of the central 
governments to undertake macroeconomic stabilization, efficiency loss due to 
poor administrative capacity of local governments to undertake the functions 
assigned to them and potential for increased corruption. 
1.3 An Indian Perspective: 
Rural development which is concerned with economic groM h^ and 
social justice, improvement in the living standard of the rural people by 
providing adequate and quality social services and minimum basic needs 
becomes essential. Thus economic growth and social justice became the 
proclaimed objective of the plaiming process under rural development from the 
very begirming. 
In 1952, the Government of India launched an ambitious country 
wide programme of Community Development and National Extension Service 
to promote the development of rural areas. This programme failed because it 
offered little scope for local priorities and decision making. The Mehta 
Committee, officially designated as the team for the study of these programme, 
felt that development can not progress without giving responsibility and power 
to the community. It was with this objective that the term recommended an 
early establishment of statutory elective local bodies and devolution to them of 
the necessary resources, power and authority. This committee recommended 
setting up of a three-tier structure of the panchayati raj institutions for effective 
decentralization. Rajasthan became the first state to implement the panchayati 
raj system on 2 October 1959, at Nagaur district. Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru 
hailed the system as "the most revolutionary and historical step in the context 
of new India". 
Since the Balwant Raj Mehta Committee did not make provisions for 
fiscal decentralization, the K. Santhanam Committee was set up in 1963 to look 
into panchayat finances. Key recommendations included powers to levy a 
special tax on land revenues and homes, consolidation of all grants at the state 
level and devolution to PRIs, and the establishment of a panchayati raj finance 
corporation to look into the financial resources of PRIs and provide loans and 
financial assistance to grass-roots level governments. 
The Ashok Mehta Committee (1978) recommended a two-tier 
system of panchayati raj with the Block as the base, and the District as the 
administrative unit for planning, coordination and resources allocation. This 
committee emphasized on appropriate management of rural development 
programme, redistribution of powers between centre and states assignment of 
the work on planning at the lower level and to set up coordination in 
development programmes. Later, the G.V.K. Rao Committee was constituted in 
1985 for reviewing the existing administrative arrangements for rural 
development and poverty alleviation schemes strongly recommended the 
revival of the PRIs all over the country, highlighting the inevitable need to 
transfer power of the state to democratic bodies at the local level. However, it 
was not till the Singhvi Conmiittee (1986) that the constitutional recognition of 
panchayats became a serious issue for the government.''* 
1.4 Constitutional Status to Panchayat 
April 24, 1993 is a red-letter day in the history of Panchayati Raj in 
India as on this day the Constitution's 73"* Amendment Act, 1992 came into 
force to provide constitutional status to the PRIs. The VS''' Amendment to the 
Constitution hence had been welcomed as focussing the attention of the nation 
on the political structures and processes of rural India. The Act provides the 
basis for the deepening and strengthening of democracy at the grass-roots level 
by returning power from centralized state structures to local unit of decision-
making. Powers were vested in elected representatives enabling them to 
determine the needs and priorities, to initiate socio-economic and political 
development and to build a society based on democratic principles. This was 
the starting point for the revolution in the field of decentralization and 
recognition of the principle of poverty reduction through rural development 
programmes. ^ ^ 
Major Features of the 73'^ '' Act: 
• Constitutional status to the panchayats and gives it uniformity by 
making the three-tier system a permanent feature. 
• Seats are reserved for SCs and STs at all levels according to their 
population. Not less than one-third of seats are reserved for women. 
• Constitution of district planning committees (DPCs) through election 
from and amongst the elected member of the district panchayat and 
municipalities. 
• Devolution of power and responsibilities by the state in preparation and 
implementation of schemes relating to the subjects listed in the eleventh 
schedule of the act. 
• State legislature authorizes the panchayats to levy, collect and 
appropriate suitable local taxes. The government can make grants-in-aid 
to the panchayats from the consolidated fiind of the concerned state. 
• Review of the financial position of the panchayats will be undertaken by 
a finance commission, which shall be constituted every five years. 
• State election commission shall be constituted to ensure free and fair 
elections to the panchayats.'^  
The 12)^^ Constitutional Amendment Act provide a three-tier structure to 
these institutions across the country viz, (1) gram panchayats at the village 
level; (2) panchayats samitee at the intermediate level; and (3) zila parishad at 
the district level. Presently in India rural local government comprise 2,34,324 
village panchayats, 6,202 intermediate panchayats, and 5,46 district 
panchayats, makmg a total of 2,41,072 at all the three levels. Total number of 
elected representative of panchayats at various levels are more than 27 lakh, of 
these nearly 37 percent are women, 19 percent belong to SCs and 12 percent 
belong to STs.'^ 
The State Legislature is required under Article 243 of the Constitution 
to transfer such powers, functions and responsibilities as to enable them to 
function as institutions of self government, meant for providing basic social 
and economic infrastructure facilities and initiate the development process at 
the grass-root level of rural areas. A separate list of 29 functions for rural local 
bodies was placed in Eleventh Schedule and is assigned to panchayats to 
implement concurrently with the state government. Each state is also required 
to appoint a State Finance Commission to make recommendations on the 
sharing and assignment of various taxes, duties, toll, fees etc. and on the grants-
in-aid to be given to the panchayats from the Consolidated Fund of the state for 
carrying out the functions assigned. Such laws may also provide for the 
devolution of powers and responsibilities upon Panchayats for the preparation 
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of plans for economic development and social justice and implementation of 
schemes for economic development and social justice as may be entrusted to 
them, including those in relation to the 29 matters listed in the Eleventh 
Schedule. The panchayats are mainly entrusted with the implementation of 
different Centrally Sponsored public works progranunes such as NEEGS, 
RGGVY, PMGSY, JAY, TSC, NRHM, CRSP, ARWSP, SSA and Mid-Day 
Meal etc administered by the various Ministries of Government of India. Thus 
decentralization of the decision-making process means that panchayats are in 
better position to identify local preference and priorities for infrastructure 
services. Panchayati raj institutions could be a promising institutional link to 
combat poverty in terms of efficient designing and effective targeting. The 
need for revitalizing panchayati raj institutions has, therefore, been recognized 
as an instrument for participated planning and implementation of various 
development programmes at grass-root level. The government is constantly 
endeavouring to empower the panchayati institutions in terms of functions, 
, powers and finance.'^  
1.5 Research Gap and Need of the Study 
From the foregoing comprehensive literature review it peters out that the 
studies in international scenario have covered almost all possible aspects of 
rural fiscal decentralization but the studies made in Indian scenario of fiscal 
decentralization to local bodies are very few with analytical framework except 
some reports of concerned agencies. There is still a gap for studing the various 
issues on fiscal decentralization and rural development in India which have 
been neglected by the authors of India based studies. It is seen that most of the 
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studies are concerned with legal environment. Some of them based on primary 
surveys to measure performance of elected representatives in local bodies. 
The issues, such as regional imbalance, sectoral shifts, changing scale of 
rural development, pattern of financing, paucity of resources, etc. have not 
been covered under any of the studies under reference. 
1.6 Research Problem 
Since independence, the issue of fiscal problems of India has continued to 
bother successive governments of the country. But less attention has been given 
to rural local government's fiscal problems and prospects, and their role in 
rural governments. Government efforts to meet the preferences of the people at 
the local levels demand that more and more responsibility be given to the local 
governments if the local goods and services are to be provided more efficiently. 
Fiscal decentralization as a term have been narrowly confined to inter-
governmental flows, excluding the massive annual developmental expenditure 
flows fi-om the Central government to rural areas. These direct expenditures in 
rural areas by the Central government compel our attention because their 
utilization rates suggest ineffective use in a context where the targeted 
objectives, ranging firom rural infi-astructure through employment schemes to 
rural sanitation, remain largely unmet. Merely routing fiinds through 
panchayats will not achieve result without physical monitoring of outcomes. 
However there is need to take up capacity building exercise on a massive scale 
for the panchayati raj functionaries and strengthen the accounting and audit 
system for the local bodies. Demands for introducing transparency in the 
functioning of the panchayats, holding regular election and meeting of the 
Gram Sabha and making public details regarding schemes undertaken and 
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funds received and spent by the panchayats are being voiced. Therefore there is 
need to formulate a more suitable fiscal policy which will adequately enable 
the panchayats to avoid the past deficiencies and perform efficiently. In 
designing such a fiscal policy, the variables impinging on performance of the 
panchayats in providing local public goods must be carefiiUy evaluated. Care 
will, therefore be taken to identify the obstacles and measures to overcome 
them.'^  
1.7 Significance of the Study 
With the aforesaid, introduction, it must be clear that Panchayati Raj 
Institutions assumes an added significance in bringing out the faster socio-
economic developnient at the local level m the rural areas. Thus, it is now 
widely accepted that self government institutions at the local level are essential 
for national growth and for effective people's participation and that they are an 
integral and indispensable part of the democratic process. "Grass-Root of 
Democracy" based on small unit of government, enable people to feel a sense 
of responsibility and to inculcate the values of democracy. At the same time it 
also offers a unique opportunity to participate m public affairs including 
development work, in a vast diverse and complex subcontent, decentralization 
is also a political and administrative imperative.'^  
From the point of view of functional utility, decentralization is perceived 
as a means to ensure more effective implementation of national policy by 
cutting through red tape and complex bureaucratic procedures. Local' 
development units can be effective links between the Central government and 
local communities, greater participation in development planning and 
management may not only promote national integration by giving people in 
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different regions of a country a greater ability to participate in planning and 
decision-making, but also increase their share in managing the local needs and 
meeting their aspirations.^ ^ 
Thus Panchayati Raj Institutions have been initiated with large 
responsibilities which they are and entitled to complete and for this they have 
to perform numerous functions both in general and specific manner. It is in this 
context that the study of fiscal behaviour of the panchayati raj institutions 
gained momentum and significance over last one decade. 
1.8 Objectives of the Study 
In the above context, the present study examines the current situation 
and presents a firamework for fiscal decentralization to rural local bodies and 
their role in rural development in India. The objectives of the present study are 
as follows: 
1. To define the desirable design of fiscal decentralization jfrom the 
viewpoint of growth acceleration with poverty reduction. 
2. To assess the tax effort and tax capacity of the panchayats. 
3. To analyse the revenue based and transfer based performance of the 
panchayats. 
4. To examine the expenditure based performance of the panchayats. 
5. To examine the implication of fiscal decentralization for targeting rural 
infrastructure programmes as rural development measure. 
6. To identify issues and make recommendations to improve the fiscal 
decentralization system. 
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The basic idea of this research is how to make panchayats result oriented 
in mobilizing resources and efficient utilization of resources, how the 
panchayati raj institutions have been able to take up the local level planning 
and development, how the people have been benefited under the new panchayat 
set up and which are the areas that need to be further addressed for 
strengthening the panchayats 
1.9 Data base and Methodology 
Our study is based exclusively on secondary data which are published 
mainly by the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Panchayati Raj and Ministry of 
Rural Development, Government of India, other departments/offices of the 
government of India and RBI. Thus, most of the relevant data have been taken 
from various issues of Indian Public Finance Statistics, Central finance 
Commission Reports, State Finance Commission Reports, Economic Survey, 
Annual Reports published by the Ministry of Rural Development and NIRD 
report. 
In terms of the methodology, the study have applied appropriate statistical 
tools which involve calculation of percentage, arithmetical average, simple 
growth rates and compound average growth rate. 
1.9.1 CAGR: 
Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) measures an annual growth 
rate over a period of time. This measure is a constant percentage rate at which a 
variable grows or contracts year on year to reach its current value. The CAGR 
is more representative measure of annual growth rate over a number of years. 
One of the commonly used formulations for estimating compound growth rate 
is as follows. 
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Yt = a(l + r)' 
Where, 
Y = Number of units of income, expenditure, 
r = Compound growth rate 
t = time. 
Talcing logarithms of both sides the above equation becomes. 
Log Yt = log a +1 log (1 + r). 
Putting 1 + r = b the above equation becomes as 
Log Yt = log a +1 log b 
This equation can be estimated using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) as under 
Logb = - j p -
Where, log yt = log Yt - log ¥ 
t* = t - t 
Thus 
Logl+r-^^°^^'^''* 
IT*' 
Or 
l + r = an t i l ogof^^ f^ 
Therefore, 
r - [mitilog of —^ IJ 
This r gives the rate of annual average growth over period t when converted in 
percentage terms 
r= lantU&g of S f e l l - . i | x 100. 
«• l i t * J 
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1.9.2 Extrapolation: 
Following procedures used in the first step to obtain the total projected 
rural population in the selected states in the years 1993-94 to 2002-03, 
The average annual rate of change 'r' in the population proportion (ratio) 
between the 1991 and 2001 censuses is calculated using the following formula: 
Pp = Po(H-r)" 
Pp = projected population, 
Po = initial population, 
r = compound/ geometric growth rate of population per annum, 
n = number of years, 
Pp in our case is equal to population as per 2001 census, Po as per 1991 census, 
n=10 
r=? 
Converted the above equation in to log linear form we open 
r= [1/10] *Ln[R2001/R 1991] 
Where, 
R 2001= Proportion of population of the development region to the national 
population in the 2001 census. 
R 1991 = Proportion of population of the development region to the national 
population in the 1991 census. 
Ln = Natural log. 
1.10 Outline of the Study 
The study is divided in to six chapters. Chapter one deals with the 
introduction of the study. This chapter covers concepts and issues in fiscal 
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decentralization, the constitutional provision, significance, research problem 
and research gap, research objectives and methodology of the study. Chapter 
two presented a survey of existing research literature on the subject. Chapter 
three discusses the intergovernmental fiscal system. Chapter four analyses the 
finances of the panchayati raj institutions in India. Chapter five assesses the 
implications of fiscal decentralization for rural development in India. Finally, 
chapter six summarizes the main conclusions of the study and 
recommendations are made to improve the fiscal decentralization system. 
18 
References 
1. Rao, M.Govinda (2007), "Rural fiscal decentralization in India: 
Problems and reform issues", Working paper, NIPFP, New Delhi, 
pp.1-15. 
2. Gupta, D.N. (2004), Introduction: Need of study of decentralization. 
Decentralization need for reforms, Concept Publishing Company, New 
Delhi, p. 4. 
3. Sethi, Geeta (2004), "Fiscal decentralization to rural government in 
India, the World Bank, ed. Geeta Sethi, Oxford University Press, p.2. 
4. Kaushik, P.D. (2005). "Rural development: decentralization and rural 
markets". Energizing rural development through panchayats (eds.) 
Bibek Debroy and P.D. Kaushik, Academic Foundation, New Delhi, pp. 
305-355. 
5. Oommen, M.A. (2006). "Fiscal decentralization to the sub-state level 
govemmenf, Economic and Political Weekly, March. 11, pp. 897-904. 
6. Cheema, G. Shabir, Rondinell, Dennis A. (2002). "From government 
decentralization to decentralized governance " pp. 1-20. 
7. Smith, Lawrence D. (2001), "Reform and decentralization of 
Agricultural services: A Policy frame work," Agricultural Policy and 
Economic Development Series 7, Food and Agriculture Organization, 
United Nations, ISSN 1020-6531. 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y2006c/y2006ccoo.htm. 
8. Eel, Robert D. Yilmaz, Serdar (2001). "Concept of fiscal 
decentralization and world wide overview," International Symposium, 
Queee Commission on Fiscal Imbalance, Quibee, Sept. 13-14, 2001 
http://www/worldbank. orgwhi ep/decentralization/library 3/ebel/yilmaz. 
19 
9. Bardhan, Pranab and Mookherjee, Dilip (2007). "The Rise of local 
governance: An overview", (eds.) Pranab Bardhan and Dilip 
Mookherjee, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp. 1-52. 
10. Cheema, G. Shabbir. Rondinelli, Dennis A. (2002). "From government 
decentralization to decentralized governance", 
http//www.brookings.edu/filii/press/nooks/2002 
11. Bird, Richard M, Fiszben, Ariel (1999). "Columbia: the central role of 
the central government in fiscal decentralization," Fiscal 
Decentralization in Developing Countries, ed. Richard Bu-d, Franois 
Vaillan Court, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 1-11. 
12. Tiwari, Nupur (2009), "Reinventing the delivery of essential social 
services at grassroots level through panchayati raj", Kurukshetra, April, 
pp.26-28. 
13. Ram, D. Sundar (2007). "Rural development and dynamics of change in 
democratic governance: Role of PRIs in India", Panchayati Raj and 
Empowering People (ed.) D. Sundar Ram, Kanishka Publishers, 
Distributors, New Delhi, pp. 222-238. 
14. Sivaramakrishnan, N. (2002). "Mahatma Gandhi and Village 
Panchayats", Panchayati Raj : Gandhian Perspective (ed.) Anil Dutta 
Mishra. Mahadeve Shivappa Dadage, Mittal Publication, New Delhi, pp. 
21-32. 
15. Sinha, Archana (2006), "Women in Local Self-Governance", Rural 
Women Empowerment (eds.) S.B. Verma and Shiv Kumar Jiloka, et al. 
Deep and Deep PubUcation, New Delhi, pp. 120-124. 
16. Sankaran, P.N. (2006), Decentralization: Institutions, Justice and Social 
Development in India, Serials Publications, New Delhi, pp. 15-17. 
17. Panchayati raj update (200), June, 2008, ppl-12. 
20 
18. Report (2002). "Decentralization and democratic local governance 
progamming hand book", Technical publication series, Centre for 
Democracy and Governance Bureau for Global Programmes, Field 
Support, and Research U.S. Agency for International Development 
Washington, D.C. 
19. Sharma, Manoj (2004), "Meaning, Nature and scope of local 
governments". Local government: Rural and Urban, Anmol 
Publications Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, p. 72. 
20. Pal, Mahi (2004). "From Raj Governance to Swaraj Governance: 
Progress, Performance and Perspective", Kurukshetra, August 2004, pp. 
4-10. 
CHAPTER-2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Singh, Ram Vinay Prasad (1993)^  in his study has Concluded that 
central point of rural development should be a block. Proportion of plan of 
rural upliftment should be done at the centre with the help of different village 
panchayats. It would be within the limit of local people. Every plan should be 
such as to meet the minimum needs of the local people. Their resources should 
be utilized and at least fifty per cent of the land revenue should be retained at 
block level to meet their necessity. Panchayat development corporation should 
be established to help the village panchayats. The corporation should raise its 
resources from rural saving to promote rural entrepreneurship. It would help in 
erecting small scale industries to provide employment opportunity to the rural 
masses. Unless it is done, the fortune of the neglected masses would not 
improve. 
Gulati, I.S. (1994)^ reported that fiinctional decentralization will remain 
only on paper if a corresponding financial devolution is not made. The task of 
the state finance commissions will be to make sure allocation of fimctions and 
responsibilities by a state to its local bodies, adequate matching financial 
powers or funds are also put at their disposal and that too without too many 
constricting conditions. As the authors of the constitutional amendments rightly 
anticipated, however, there could arise the need to supplement the funds of the 
state governments in order to make adequate devolution to their local bodies. 
The present practice of talking up the quinquermial review ab initio 
when a new finance commission is appointed, with a small all in the finance 
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ministry doing the follow-up to the quinquennial award is certainly not the 
most efficient way of doing such a major exercise, which by its very nature has 
to be undertaken on a continuing basis and not in spurts. Once the centre takes 
the initiative and puts the national level arrangements on a permanent footing, 
the states too could consider making similar arrangement at their level. 
In any case, the question of augmenting the finance of the state 
governments to enable them to devolve adequate finances and/or financial 
powers to the local bodies will have to be faced immediately, if decentralized is 
meant to be pursued in earnest 
Sundaram, K.V. (1998)^  has analysed that several aspects of 
decentralization will require the attention of governments both in Asia and 
Africa. In order to consolidate the progress made thus far. Among these, one of 
the most important relates to capacitation. Ultimately, the success of 
decentralization will depend, to a considerable extent, on the capacities 
available at the local level and on an appropriate set of assigned 
responsibilities. The key to generating and sustaining the momentum for 
decentralization will lie with the growth of properly motivated and empowered 
participatory groups at the grass roots level. Another consideration relates to 
the role of voluntary agencies. In none of the countries under review has any 
serious and systematic effort been made to incorporate their operations into the 
government's decentralized planning fi*amework. Yet, need to be restated, as 
the gap between how things should be and how they actually are does not seem 
to have been bridged over the years. One in escapable conclusion is that the 
emergence of a legitimate representative local government keeping pace with 
the historical changes taking place in social systems and in the light of a 
desired agenda of transformation is still a far cry. 
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Punalekar, S.P. (2001)'* in his study has fiimished that the Pnchayati raj 
system is a necessary social mechanism, as it respects the energy and 
imagination of common people and enables them to participate in social, 
economic, political and cultural affairs of the village. The village is then-
common habitat and common destiny. Hence their involvement is a must. But 
it is equally necessary to create more supportive and enabling conditions so that 
all segments of rural society can participate on equal terms and with a sense of 
dignity and vigor. In order to bring about such a situation, it is vital that land 
reforms are carried out immediately and land titles are also given to women 
members. Secondly, the question of caste and caste consciousness can not be 
neglected for long. All the efforts need to be made by political and non-
political actors to defuse the caste tensions in the village, and empower the 
Dalits and other marginal classes to enjoy the rights of social participation. 
Experience has shown that when women leaders in the village have been the 
reigns of power in village panchayats, there has been decisive and meaningful 
improvement in the key sectors of village society and economy, be it land 
patta, sanitation, drinking water or a primary school. They have challenged the 
male stream dominant view of village society as a patriarchal society and have 
been successful, in highlighting the village issues from the feminist 
perspective; a perspective, which is eco-sensitive, and rights respecting. 
Bhel, Robert D. and Yilmaz, Serdar (2001)^ have analysed that fiscal 
decentralization is a multifaceted complex issue. Legal and constitutional 
framework as well as institutional structure of the public administration system 
in each country has a bearing on the outcome of fiscal decentralization 
application. The success of fiscal decentralization reforms is inextricably tied 
to the question of "sorting-out public sector responsibilities among different 
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levels of government there is no prescribed set of rules for "sorting-out" that 
apply to all countries. 
Although specific aspects of fiscal decentralization can be worked out in 
the context of each individual country, the common component of designing a 
decentralized system of intergovernmental fiscal relations in all countries are 
assignment of responsibilities for governmental functions, assignment of the 
power among levels of government to tax people and collect revenues, the 
nature of intergovernmental transfer system and ability of subnational 
governments to borrow. The failure to design these interrelated components in 
a consistent way may lead to undesirable resuhs. However, the issue of 
designing an effective intergovernmental structure is not limited to these 
components. It involves electing local government officials, having approved 
budget locally, absence of mandates on local governments as regards to 
employment and salaries, keeping adequate books of account and monitoring, 
progress towards an effective fiscal decentralization. 
Singh, Ramjee (2002)^ has stated that the acid test of the panchayat 
system is in providing economic as well as social democracy and develop a 
sense of self reliance. The root cause of the failure of the community 
development programme is that the inhabitants of a typical village do not 
constitute a community. The economic inequalities are aggravated by social 
disabilities are deep-rooted in the caste system. The cooperative societies, 
controlled as they are in most part of the country by rich farmers, seldom castes 
to the needs of the weaker sections of the population. Gandhi, Vinoba and J.P. 
tried to put content in the form called panchayat by creating a community first. 
A village should not be treated as a mere geographical entity with some human 
population but as a community having commcm interests - both economic and 
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political. In China, there was the commune, in Russia Kolkhoz, in Israel the 
Kibutz, but in India it was the panchayat. Self reliance should be another 
fundamental feature of the panchayat without which its self governance will 
always be in jeopardy. Self reliance and self governance go together. Self 
reliance alone can create real involvement of the people. If the panchayats fight 
shy of raising their own resources for which they must have authority and 
depend solely in the central or state doles, they can never become a people's 
organ. 
Gunatilaka, Ramani (2002)' has analysed that fiscal decentralization 
theory and practice offer useful in sights to policy makers intent on targeting 
rural infrastructure programmers to reduce poverty. The intergovernmental 
transfer system can certainly help target resources to disadvantaged 
jurisdictions and for pro-poor projects within jurisdictions. Different factor 
endowments of different jurisdictions may make it more cost-effective for one 
to provide services to another. The typical policy-response to such skill over 
that emerges from the fiscal decentralization literature is for the central 
government to provide specific purpose transfer to the Jurisdiction providing 
the service. 
Finally, while the relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
economic growth remains unclear in the literature, the idea that greater fiscal 
decentralization can bring about regional growth and greater inter-regional 
equity currently enjoys wide appeal. But this study suggests that fiscal 
decentralization and rural development policies that aim to achieve these 
objectives are fundamentally flawed. They are unlikely to reduce rural poverty 
and urban-rural differentials significantly when implemented alongwith macro 
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economic policies that favour the dynamic forces of urban agglomeration. The 
analysis suggests that contrary to conventional wisdom, rural-poverty reduction 
may actually need policies that favour planned urbanization in line with 
centripetal forces that will case the pressure on agricultural holdings, making 
them more viable for those who remain in rural areas. Policy-makers and 
donors looking to fiscal decentralization to reduce rural poverty need to be 
more realistic in their expectation. 
Rao, M.Govinda (2002)^ argued that poverty alleviation is not merely a 
redistributive function. It involves both 'capacity improving' and 'safety net 
policies. While policies aimed at accelerating growth and directing the benefits 
of growth will help to reduce poverty in the long term, direct redistribution 
such as providing basic education, health care and employment policies 
provide safety nets to the poor in the short term. In addition, the old and 
disabled poor need to be provided with doles. The study analyses the design of 
general and specific purpose transfer schemes relevant for poverty alleviation 
strategy. General purpose transfers are meant to augment the capacity and 
therefore, should be designed to offset fiscal disabilities of poor regions. This 
would enable them to provide social and physical infi"astructure, at levels 
comparable to those in richer Jurisdictions at equivalent tax rates. Such 
transfers will enable the depressed regions to fully utilize their growth potential 
and their impacts on poverty. In order to design and implement effective anti-
poverty programme, in addition to the general purpose transfers, it is necessary 
to provide specific purpose transfers. These transfers are intended to ensure that 
the services required to combat poverty directly or 'categorical equity' services 
are provided in required quantities. The wealth neutrality condition of these 
anti-poverty programmers requires that they should be provided within the 
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framework of a cost-sharing scheme between the central and local 
governments. The shares to be paid by the local governments should vary 
inversely with the wealth position or fiscal capacity of the local governments. 
Jha, Shikha (2002)^  has evaluated the fiscal success of recent efforts 
towards reforming and strengthening rural governments in India through the 
process of rural decentralization initiated with the 73'"'* constitutional 
amendment Act in 1992. It measures the extent of fiscal decentralization that 
has been taken place in order to evaluate how far the rural governments have 
effective control over expenditure decision-making. The analysis is based on 
budget data of rural governments in seven Indian states for the decade of the 
1990s and presents recommendations to make fiscal decentralization more 
effective. 
Sira, Subrabmanyam, K. (2003)'° in his work has expressed that 
notwithstanding the 73'^ '' Amendment Act, the issue of devolution of 
responsibilities, powers and resources on panchayats has not received adequate 
attention of the states. The new or modified statutes have merely or largely 
reiterated the dispensation that was akeady in vogue. States do not have the 
necessary 'political will' to strengthen these units of rural local self 
government. Due to their limited revenue base, their survival is strictly 
conditioned by the grants-in-aid from the state and union government. State 
Finance commissions appointed in conformity with Article 243(1) have also not 
been able to adequately and effectively address to their needs. To cap it, states 
are very lethargic in implementing the recommendations of these commissions. 
Even the National Finance commissions, which have endeavored to provide 
some additional assistance to the panchayats, decentralization could not 
provide them any solace 
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Against the backdrop of the disheartening scenario, the issue of 
devolution can no longer be delayed. Experience gained during the last eight 
years impacts a sense of urgency and calls for sharper correctives in terms of 
attitudinal changes, positive mental make up and a pro-panchayati raj stance by 
the states. 
Shah, Anwar et al (2004)'' has criticized that decentralization whereby 
local governments are empowered to make all policy and program decisions on 
behalf of their resident-voters represents a complex system of political, 
administrative and fiscal autonomy and associated accountability mechanisms 
to ensure responsiveness and accountability to voters. While in theory, such a 
system is expected to have positive impacts on the efficiency and equity of 
public service provision, in practice, these outcomes depend upon the existing 
institutional arrangements (including power relations) and coherence of 
decentralization policies to create the proper incentive environment for bottom-
up accountability. This explains the myriad of outcomes that we see in practice. 
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence presented here is broadly supportive of a 
positive influence of decentralization policies in reforming pubic sector in 
developing countries. 
Ghosh, Dilip Kumar (2004)'^ has pointed out that the role of panchayats 
in infrastructure development is limited. In rural areas, the panchayats samiti 
has some role through EAS, JRY, and BADP. However in rural water supply, 
the panchayats role is worth mentioning since they bear complete responsibility 
for drinking water and have ensured coverage. The only weak area is that in the 
pYoc,e.ss of selecting \h& sports, local ^vomen's choices are mostly ignored. 
Unfortunately, despite sincere wishes of the state government to involve the 
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people in all stages of the fiinctioning of the panchayats, the grassroot 
experiences tell a different storey. The decisions taken by the panchayats tend 
to be adhoc as the participation of the people in the decision- making process is 
limited and infrequent. There may be some exceptions, but they are few. 
Rajaraman, Indira (2004)''' has revealed that increased decentralization/ 
democratization does increase school enrolment rates and lower child mortality 
rates, after controlling for socio-economic curcumstances, civil society 
organizations and capture of LBs by elite groups. There is also some evidence 
that greater ethnic fragmentation in the local context in India my lead to more, 
rather than less, fiscal discipline, contrary to political economy theories 
showing that greater ethnic fragmentation leads to low valuation of public 
goods, higher valuation of patronage and absence of fiscal discipline. It is 
possible that fragmentation prevents the consensus needed among local elites in 
respect of directions of collusive corruption. This finding is important in the 
context of theoretical result where susceptibility to capture is an important 
variable determining whether or not decentralization outperforms 
centralization. More confirmatory evidence is clearly needed on these issues. 
Pal, Mahi (2004)^ "* has revealed that the constitutional amendment act 
has created decentralized institutions in the form of PRIs across of the country. 
These institutions have great potential too promoting development of masses 
through their participations at various forums created under the system. But the 
potential of these institutions has not been exploited fully because the pre-
conditions for that in terms of making these bodies as institutions of self 
governments (ISGs) as envisaged in the constitution have not been created. 
Hence, in order to accelerate the process of promoting rights of the people, 
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particularly those on bottom rung of the ladder in term of socio-economic 
development panchayats should be strengthened further and given functional, 
financial and administrative autonomy at their different levels so that the 
elected representatives have full freedom to play their role effectively. Besides 
developmental functions, the judicial system may also be decentralized for 
settling disputes arising in the course of implementation of different schemes 
and programmers connected with the 29 subjects listed in the 11 schedule of 
the constitution at the local level. 
Pal, Mahi (2004)^ ^ has concluded that panchayati raj as a system of local 
governance had a weak foundation. The central and the state governments, 
instead of initiating such policies which could strengthen the PRS, have used 
these institutions as conduits for distributing funds to the target groups. Among 
others, the purpose of the constitution of PRIs was to create a new leadership at 
local levels which would not only abjure obscuranitism and backward looking 
attitude but also would be instrumental in changing the anti-development out 
look of the traditional caste leaders in the villages so that the people could 
achieve their collective aspiration of developing themselves holistically. It is 
therefore essential for panchayats leaders to get organized and to form their 
associations at local, district, state and national levels in order to enhance 
panchayats bargaining powers and enable themselves to learn from each other 
and extensively deliberate matters of common interest. But it may be cautioned 
here that the enlightened leaders of the panchayats should come forward for 
this venture list it should also go the way of the All India panchayat parishad 
which has lost its utility due to its internal functional rivalry. 
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Kaushik, P.D. (2005)^ ^ has studied that we need to develop a strong 
infrastructure at various levels. Apart from mobilizing people, infrastructure is 
also necessary to organize input supply, finance, post-production processing 
and marketing of the produce. Inadequate marketing network is another major 
bottleneck in agriculture. Adequate information channels must be put in place 
to make swift forecast of the demand for various commodities and exploit to 
reach the customers without involving too many middlemen. Such support 
systems are an integral aspect of sustainable rural development. 
An ideal linkage of various stakeholders at various levels of agricultural 
development is an efficient and effective way for a sustainable rural 
development plan. The role of voluntary sector becomes all the more critical in 
establishing such linkages between the stake holders. Self-help groups (SHG) 
of 10-20 farmers can be an effective non-formal organization to provide 
necessary services and facilities to the community. These groups can share 
their concerns and plans on various development activities to be undertaken 
jointly and individually. Successful initiatives from the voluntary sector have 
shown better scope for rural development outside government agencies, 
especially in the organization of procurement of agricultural inputs, credit, 
technical services and marketing of the produce. Voluntary sector working at 
the block level has played a significant role in capacity building of the SHGs 
and farmers' organisations and facilitates a close link between the SHGs and 
gram panchayats. 
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of the panchayats. Gram panchayats should be given the major responsibility 
regarding planning and implementation of primary education programmers. 
For carrying out the added responsibilities adequate staff must be transferred to 
the panchayats. The roles and responsibilities of this staff have to be clearly 
defined in the government order and accountability of each staff should lie with 
the panchayats. The role of the district and block panchayats should be limited 
to providing technical inputs and resources. Panchayats should be enabled to 
prepare village level plans. Due weightage should be given to the finance 
proposed in the village plan prepared by the gram sabha and accordingly funds 
need to be transferred to the panchayats. To enable panchayats to implement 
need based programme, unified funds need to be given, the expenditure of 
which can be socially audited in the gram sabha. Government and civil society 
organizations need to take up systematic and concerted efforts to build 
capacities of elected membersof panchayats and also gram sabha members to 
carry out the new and increased responsibilities effectively. 
Ponnuraj, S. (2005)'^ has depicted that experience and findings of 
studies on fi-esh water situation in hidia suggest that there is no one problem 
and one region to suggest remedial measures. The water has close linkage with 
the food security, industrial development, environmental restoration and quality 
of life of the people. Water use and regeneration has to be integrated effectively 
as it was done by our ancient rulers. The flood for auto water security increases 
opportunity for our rural community to lead productive life. 
The awareness of communities on safe water and sources should be 
enhanced at all cost and at all levels. PRIs can be vested with the authority, 
responsibility and accountability to be the care takers, managers and protectors. 
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Domestic water supply in rural areas should be owned by the community 
themselves for better cost recovery and sustainability. Only the communities 
which are aware and participate in managing their water supply will be able to 
protect and sustain it. 
Meenakshi SundaramJ S.S. (2005)'^ has observed that while the primary 
responsibility of implementing rural development programmers should 
squarely lie with the PRIs in their own interest, we need to guard these 
institutions against degenerating into another set of government department 
mechanically implementing schemes in due course. It is absolutely necessary to 
ensure people's participation at all times, particularly at the time of planning 
and implementation if the PRIs have to succeed in delivering development 
benefits to the people. System and procedures have to be evolved to ensure that 
such consultations take place on a continuous and sustained basis, instead of at 
the whims and fancies of the local leaders. Enlightened citizens and civil 
society organizations should play an advocacy role to ensure that the PRIs are 
given adequate freedom to perform their tasks in rural development and also to 
evolve a system of social audit through people's participation in the gram 
Sabha. Once the PRIs establish themselves in the field of rural development, 
they can graduate into becoming full-fledged local self governments dealing 
with all aspects of local governance in due course. 
De, Indranil (2006)^° has argued that the success of decentralization 
depends on fulfillment of a number of conditions. Community participation 
seems to be the key to success in decentralization effort. For ensuring 
community participation transparency and respecting the right of the local 
people is essential. Experiences from different developing countries including 
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India corroborate to findings. Analysis at the micro levels shows that peoples 
knowledge about swajaldhara project and their preference towards opting for 
total sanitation campaign (TSC) is low. Swajaldhara Project has only drawn 
relatively better off people. It is evident from the micro level study that 
information dissemination and capacity building at the lower level has to be 
strengthened for the success of these programme. Political accoimtability has 
also to be improved for efficient functioning of the panchayats and uphold 
people's faith on local governments. The quality aspect of services has also to 
be given due attention. Moreover, government must ensure that these 
programmers are not thrust on the people. These programmers will not be fully 
successful unless spontaneous and substantial community participation is 
ensured. 
Pal, Mahi (2006) '^ has pointed out that the possible role of PRIs in 
effective implementation of Bharat Nirman Programme at grassroots level, the 
author strongly feels that the proposed objectives of the programme could be 
achieved in the stipulated time if panchayats be made as institutions of self-
governments i.e. they should enjoy functional, financial and administrative 
autonomy at their level and the plan formulation of these components should 
emerge from the Gram Sabha for onward consideration in the gram panchayat. 
Also, activating gram sabha is very important to decide projects under the six 
components of the Bharat Nirman and their proper monitoring and evaluation. 
Srivastave, Ravi S (2006)^ ^ has observed that the capture of panchayats 
by the dominant groups could seriously jeopardize the anticipated benefits of 
decentralization, especially in the context of anti-poverty programmes. Our 
result mdicate that local democratic institutions are still prone to capture by the 
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village elite and are generally too weak to influence the individualistic styles of 
functioning of elected officials. Devolution of anti-poverty programmes to 
PRIs has been treated with some scepticism in the light of prevailing rural 
inequalities. In the case of UP, the existing devolutionary process is also 
heavily circumscribed by the continuing role of the bureaucracy. It is, therefore 
some what surprising that even with all the limitations and evidence of poor 
performance, the beneficiaries of anti-poverty programmes in the study villages 
and the other villages still express quantified support for decentralization. 
Oommen, M.A. (2006)^ ^ concluded that, after more than a decade of 
decentralized governance the emerging fiscal decentralization scenario is 
disquieting. The percentage of local government expenditure in relation to total 
government expenditure has declined significantly during the period 1998-99 
to 2002-03. The progress of expenditure decentrlaisation in 11 out of the 15 
states appears to be on the decline. The revenue decentralization trend is also 
no better. That the average rate of growth in the tax revenue of PRIs and ULBs 
in most of the states in the country had been negative or declining provides a 
wrong signal. It renders impossible any effort towards building autonomous 
local governments. As regards transfers to the local government, reckoned in 
terms of the GDP, state revenue and state expenditure, the overall trend has 
been very discouraging, although there are significant exceptions. Again, while 
by and large, the per capita transfers to rural governments and higher than that 
of the ULBs, the per capita transfers to the ULBs are very high in the states 
like Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal. The performance 
of SFCs which have the responsibility to mediate in the revenue sharing 
between the state and the LGs leaves many things to be desired. The functional 
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mapping with reference to state and LGs on the one hand and that among the 
three tiers of PRIs has not made much progress in most states. 
Rajaraman, Indira and Sinha, Darshy (2007)^ '* analysed that the most 
astonishing feature of decentralization of governance in India has been the 
complete absence of a uniform accounting system that would render 
transparent the transfer of functions mandated. This is a major deficiency of the 
process of decentralization In India. Accounting uniformity was entirely 
compatible with the freedom rightly granted to state governments to shape the 
contours and speed of decentralization. Even transfer of state funds to PRIs 
under some major national schemes like the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee, the Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana, and the Swamajayanti Gram 
Swarozgar Yojana, is not uniformly dealt with across states in terms of budget 
heads, which unlike the grant structure do carry a requirement of uniformity. 
The structure of budget heads and sub-heads is nationally uniform, and 
therefore any departures found in practice constitute a violation of that 
requirement of uniformity. The structure of demands for grants however is not 
required to be nationally uniform. Here the appeal for a common structure is 
based on the need for monitoring the process of functional transfer over time. 
Ram, D Sundar (2007)^ ^ viewed that 73'''' constitution amendment has 
empowered the panchayati raj institutions as constitutional bodies. The local 
self-governing institutions (LSGIs) are in essence created through the process 
of devolution. If sufficient powers are devolved, the grassroots democratic 
institutions would get strength to become effective instrumentalities of socio-
economic change. Following the enactment of 73'^ '^  constitution amendment in 
1993, all state governments in India are striving for strengthening people' 
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participation in decentralized governance through the panchayati raj 
institutions. However, it has always been problem as to how this concept can 
be practiced effectively in such a way that people could be closely associated in 
the decision - making process at grass roots level. 
It is hoped that under the changed scenario, the grassroots democratic 
institutions would be able to tackle rural development problems and fulfill the 
desires and aspirations of the rural people. But this capability can be changed if 
political commitment is there in favour of transfer of power from state 
governments to PRIs. For achieving this, the panchayati raj bodies have to be 
empowered for their team work has to be encouraged and the governments both 
at the centre and states have to improve continuously for implementing the 
rural development programmes. 
Tiwari, Nupur (2009)^ ^ has concluded that active participation of people 
in grassroots plaiming will bring about the desired transformation of the region 
by establishing peace and setting in motion the wheels of progress towards 
prosperity. Moving from a model of central provision to that of decentralization 
to local goverrmients introduces a new relationship between national and local 
policy makers, while altering several existing relationship such as the between 
the citizens, elected politicians and the local bureaucracy. 
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CHAPTER-III 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL SYSTEM IN INDIA 
i n . l Introduction 
There are many countries of the world which have a federal form of 
government. Developed countries like, USA, Canada, Australia and 
Switzerland and developing countries like India, Pakistan, Malaya, Nigeria and 
West Indies have also adopted some forms of federalism suited to their own 
requirement. In a federal form of government system there is a union 
government for the whole country, and different governments for each part of 
region of the country. The distribution of powers, functions and finances 
between union or central government and the state or regional governments 
differ fi*om country to country. The principle on which the distribution of 
powers is made is that those matters which have importance for the country as 
a whole are entrusted to the central government, such as foreign relations, 
defense, communications, etc. and those matters which are considered to be of 
local significance, are assigned to the units, eg. education, public health, 
agriculture, etc.^  
Fiscal federalism entails the division of responsibilities in respect of 
taxation and public expenditure among the different layers of the government. 
It helps governmental organization to realize cost efficiency by economies of 
scale in providing public services, which correspond most closely to the 
preference of the people. The financial arrangements between the two are a 
matter of great importance. The constitution of every federal state has clear 
provisions for such allocation of resources. 
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The Indian Constitution, in its seventh schedule has specified the 
expenditure responsibilities as well as the resource raising domains of both the 
centre and the states through three lists: Union list, state list and concurrent list. 
With the 73''' and lA^ Amendments to the Constitution in 1992, local 
governments in rural and urban area too have been accorded Constitutional 
recognition. The assignment of tax powers is based on the principle of 
separation, i.e. tax categories or exclusively assigned either to the centre or to 
the states. Most broad-based and progressive tax powers are assigned to the 
centre. The important central taxes are customs, excise duties on manufactured 
goods, personal income tax, and corporate income tax. The states also have a 
few tax bases assigned to them, but from the viewpoint of revenue, the power 
to levy retail sales is the most important. The Constitution provides for a much 
greater degree of substantial decentralization of expenditure responsibilities 
than the powers to raise resources, create the familiar problem of fiscal gap. 
The Constitution recognized that its assignment of tax powers and 
expenditure functions would create imbalances between expenditure needs and 
abilities to raise revenue. The imbalances could be both vertical, among 
different levels of governments and horizontal, among different units within a 
sub-central level. Indian fiscal federalism is marked by high degree of vertical 
and horizontal fiscal imbalance. The system is then brought in balance by the 
mechanism of intergovernmental fiscal transfers which may take the form of 
revenue sharing and grants. The nature and extent of fiscal transfers can be 
decided upon in the context of incentives and allocation efficiency taking into 
account vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances. 
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A notable feature of transfers system in India is the existence of multiple 
channels. The Constitution provides for flow of centre's revenue to the states in 
segments, viz. devolution of a part of the centre's divisible taxes and grant-in-
aid of revenue to states in need of assistance under article 275 of the 
Constitution through the finance commission, transfer through the planning 
commission in the form of assistance for state plans, transfers to implement 
centrally sponsored schemes (CSSs) under the central sector plan, and other 
discretionary transfers. The statutory transfers also have several components 
viz. tax devolution, revenue deficit grants, grants for upgradation and special 
problems and grants meant for local bodies and calamity relief.^  
As regards the local bodies are concerned, the state legislature is 
required under Article (243G, 243W, 243ZD) of the Indian Constitution to 
transfer such powers, functions and responsibilities as to enable them to 
function as institutions of self-government. The State legislature is also 
required to appomt a State Finance Commission (SFC) to make 
recommendations on the sharing and assignment of various taxes, duties, tolls, 
fees etc., and on the grants-in-aid to be given to the local bodies fi-om the 
consolidated fund of the state.'' 
The transfer system is beset with many problems. Multiple transfer 
channels sometimes work at cross purposes, creating serious problems of 
focusing the transfers on fiscally disadvantaged states. The methodology 
adopted by the Finance commission transfers that of filling the gaps between 
projected revenues and expenditures - has not only created serious 
disincentives, but also results in inequity. The system does not attempt 
significant equalization, as projections of expenditures for poorer states and 
made from a low base. The distinction made between plan and non-plan 
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transfers also has segmented the budget with adverse consequences on fiscal 
management. Furthermore, the proliferation of specific purpose transfers has 
led to inefficiency in expenditure management. These problems have 
significantly politicized the transfer system.^  
The time is opportune to restructure the multilevel fiscal system to meet 
the challenges of transition to the market and opening up of the economy. The 
inefficiencies in the economy and the inherent contradictions arising from the 
inefficient economic process comes into open as the economy is opened up. 
The chapter attempt to bring out the major shortcomings impinging on the 
efficiency and equity in the federal fiscal system in India and addresses the 
issues of reform in fiscal arrangements in the changed context. 
Section II deals with the evolution and structure of Indian federalism. 
Section III describes expenditure and tax assignments in India including 
powers and fiinctions. Section IV relates to fiscal imbalances its trends and 
issues. Section V deals with intergovernmental transfer system and the 
principle that guide their design. Section VI pointed out fiscal decentralization 
to local governments. 
III.2 Indian Federalism: Evolution and Structure 
India represents a classical federation with constitutional demarcation of 
fiinctions and finances between the Union and the States. The federal ensemble 
comprises a Central government, 28 states, 2 Union Territories (UTs) with 
legislatures, and 5 Union Territories without own legislatures. Separate 
legislative, executive and judicial arms of government are constituted at both 
Central and state levels. The upper house or Rajya Sabha in the parliament is 
the Council of states. The Seventh Schedule to the Constitution specifies the 
legislative domains of the Central and state governments in terms of Union, 
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State and Concurrent Lists. The Constitution also requires the president of 
India to appoint a Finance Commission every five years to review the finances 
of the Centre and the states and recommend devolution of taxes and grant-in-
aid for the ensuing five years. While the Planning Commission which was set 
up by a resolution of the government, works under the overall guidance of the 
National Development Council. With the 73'''' and 74''' Constitutional 
Amendments in 1993 about 2.5 lakh local government units have been created 
in urban and rural areas to provide an enabling environment for decentralized 
provision of public services.^  
Organization of Multilevel Fiscal System in India 
^' 
Union Territories 
directly controlled 
by the centre 
1 
Urban Local 
Governments 
' 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
u 
> ' 
State Governments 
Municipal Corporation 
1 r 
> f 
Rural Local 
Governments 
1 f 
District Panchayat 
' ' 
Municipalities 
Nagar Panchayat 
Block Panchayat 
Village Panchayat 
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The political set up existed in India on the eve of independence was 
federal in nature and it was working under the Government of India Act 1935. 
The centralization inherent in constitutional assignment was further 
strengthened by the adoption of a planned development strategy. This not only 
caused the concentration of economic power but also led to the introduction of 
several controls and regulations with attendant distortions on relative prices and 
economic incentives. Rationing, price controls and regulations introduced to 
manage the shortage economy contributed to market segmentation further and 
even when the economy transited into surpluses, strong distributional coalitions 
created by the system have resisted reforms to meet changing requirements, 
III.3 Expenditure and Tax Assignments in India 
An important precondition for the efficient functioning of a multi-level 
fiscal system is to have a proper assigimient system. The assignments of 
functions demarcate the spheres of responsibility of different governmental 
units. The demarcation of the sources of finance endows the ability and 
flexibility to different governmental units to undertake the functions assigned 
to them. Efficient assignment should provide sufficient flexibility to all 
governmental units to vary the levels of public service-tax mix at the margin to 
cater to the diversified preferences of the consumers, minimize inter-
jurisdiction tax and benefit spillovers and provide adequate finances to the 
central government to undertake regional equalization so that 'competitive 
equality' of the jurisdictions or horizontal equity' of mdividuals across the 
federation is established.^ 
III.3.1 Assignment between Centre and State Governments: The 
Indian Constitution, in its Seventh Schedule, assigns the powers and functions 
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of the centre and the states. The schedule specifies the exclusive powers of the 
centre in the union list, exclusive powers of the states in the state list', and 
those falling under the joint jurisdiction are placed in the concurrent list. All 
residuary powers are assigned to the centre. The functions related to maintain 
macro economic stability, international trade and relations, defence, atomic 
energy, external borrowing and those having implications for more than one 
state are assigned exclusively to the Centre. The functions involving benefits 
spanning across states and matters with significant development potential are 
undertaken concurrently with the States. These include economic planning, 
public health, education, agriculture, irrigation, fisheries, industries and minor 
minerals. The tax handles have been assigned to the states include land 
revenue, tax on agricultural income and wealth, stamp duties and registration 
fees, tax on sale and purchase of goods, excises on alcoholic beverages, 
entertainment tax and tax on motor vehicles etc.^  
The nature of the assignments is typical of federal nations. The 
assignment of tax powers is based on the principle of separation, i.e. tax 
categories are exclusively assigned either to the centre or to the states. Most 
broad-based taxes have been assigned to the centre, including taxes on non-
agricultural income. Out of a long list of taxes assigned to the states, only the 
tax on the sale and purchase of goods has been significant for state revenues. 
On the other hand, the states have a high shares of expenditure on internal 
security, law and order, social services and economic services like agriculture, 
animal husbandry, forestry, fisheries and irrigation and public works. The 
states share in expenditure on administrative services is about 68 per cent, on 
social services they spend about 83 per cent and on economic services their 
share is about two-thirds. 
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Recognizing that the Constitutional assignment would result in 
imbalances between revenue capacities and expenditure needs at the state level, 
the Constitution provides for the sharing of revenue from central taxes. Prior to 
the enactment of the Constitution (Eightieth Amendment) Act 2000, taxes on 
incomes other than non-agricultural income and union excise duty were shared 
with the states. In addition, the states in need of further assistance can be given 
grant-in-aid from the Consolidated Fund of India. Both tax devolution and 
grants-in-aid have to be determined by the Finance commission, an 
independent body appointed by the President every five years. Planning 
Commission too has been giving substantial assistance to the states to finance 
development plans. In addition to Finance and Planning Commission, Central 
Ministries give assistance to the states to implement central schemes.'° 
III.3.2 Assignment between State and Local Governments: The 73"' 
and 74* Amendments of the Constitution passed in 1993 are milestone in the 
evolution of a true federal set-up in India. Regarding the functional and fiscal 
powers, the Amendments incorporated two Schedules to the Constitution, 
Eleventh schedule contains a subject list of 29 entries for rural bodies, while 
Twelfth Schedule contains a subject list of 19 entries for urban bodies. The 
schedules referred only detail the responsibilities of the local governments and 
not their revenue sources. Actual devolution of specific revenue sources and 
expenditure functions to local governments depends on the willingness of the 
state government to devolve functions and powers to the local governments." 
The state legislature is also required to appoint a State Finance Commission 
(SFC) to recommend the devolution of resources for carrying out the function 
assigned. The responsibilities of the commission include (i) distribution of the 
states' revenues between states and local governments and determining the 
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allocation of individual local government; (iii) assignment of tax and non tax 
powers to village panchayats and urban local bodies; and (iv) determination of 
the grants in aid to local governments from the consolidated fund of the state. 
In addition to their own lump sum transfers, States pass on the transfers 
received from the Central Finance Commission. Besides, there are various 
Central sector and centrally sponsored schemes to the local governments. The 
important schemes are for water supply, poverty alleviation, rural roads, 
education and health and for social justice in which local governments have a 
• 12 
comparative advantage in implementation. 
III.4 Fiscal Imbalances: Trends and Issues 
Fiscal imbalances take place due to unsuitable expenditure and tax 
assignment, limited or unproductive tax bases accessible to lower levels of 
government, making tax rates incorrectly high and inter-state tax competition. 
In India, the revenue raising power of the states is limited comparatively, with 
the passage of time the expenditure needs of the states increased considerably, 
while the income could not cope up with this trend. This is mainly due to the 
fact that generally more resources are assigned to the Central Government, may 
be on grounds of equity and efficiency, compared to its responsibilities. 
Moreover, states differ with respect to capacities and needs.'^ 
III.4.1 Vertical Fiscal Imbalance in India: A vertical imbalance system 
exists in the system by design where revenues are more centralized and 
I 
responsibilities more decenfralized. It refers to the simultaneous mismatch 
between expenditure and revenues at different levels of government. Broadly, 
vertical fiscal imbalance measures the extent of dependence of the state 
governments on the union government and this is normally measured by the 
ratio of own revenue to total expenditure incurred by the state. The emergence 
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of vertical imbalance can be traced back to differences in resource mobilization 
capacity of different levels of government an expenditure responsibilities.*'^ 
The constitutional assignment and developments over the years have 
caused a high degree vertical fiscal imbalance. As shown in Table 3.1, the State 
governments in 2006-07 collected only 38.60 per cent of total revenues 
receipts, but their share in total expenditure was 58.20 per cent. From the 
revenue sources assigned to them, they could finance only 55.80 per cent of 
their revenue expenditure in 2006-07. 
Table 3.1 
Year 
1955-56 
1960-61 
1970-71 
1980-81 
1990-91 
1995-96 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07(RE) 
Trends in Vertical Fiscal Imbalance 
Per cent of state 
own revenue 
receipts to total 
revenue receipts 
41.2 
36.6 
35.5 
35.6 
35.2 
39.2 
38.6 
37.8 
40.2 
38.28 
37.54 
38.10 
37.07 
38.60 
Per cent of 
states revenue 
expenditure to 
total revenue 
expenditure 
59.0 
59.9 
60.2 
59.6 
54.6 
57.0 
56.4 
56.0 
56.9 
54.37 
56.27 
56.28 
56.59 
57.34 
Per cent of 
states own 
revenue 
receipts to 
state revenue 
expenditure 
68.9 
63.9 
60.6 
60.1 
53.1 
58.6 
49.8 
48.6 
50.0 
56.01 
53.83 
60.05 
56.07 
55.80 
Per cent of 
states 
expenditure* 
to total 
expenditure 
61.7 
56.8 
53.9 
56.0 
51.7 
55.8 
56.0 
56.1 
56.3 
55.14 
57.65 
56.64 
58.10 
58.20 
* Current + Capital expenditure 
RE: Revised estimates 
Source: Public Finance Statistics 
India. 
(2007-08), Ministry of Finance, Government of 
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Interestingly, even when the States' revenues grew at a rate faster than 
that of the Centre, their fiscal dependence on the latter increased. Although the 
States' share is raising revenue has marginally increased since mid 1980s, as 
their expenditure share increased at as faster rate, causing increase in fiscal 
dependence. Thus, the proportion of States' revenue expenditures financed 
from own revenues declined form 60 per cent in 2004-05 to 55.8 per cent in 
2006-07. The States' share in total expenditures increased from 52 per cent in 
1990-91 to 58 per cent in 2006-07. However, this does not signify increase in 
decentralization for, the spending financed by specific purpose transfer on 
which the states' have little maneuverability have shown a sharp increase in 
recent years. 
III.4.2 Horizontal Fiscal Imbalance in India : Horizontal imbalance 
emerges due to differences in endowment of various physical factors and 
revenue efforts among the states. The difference in mobilization of revenue 
across the states is on account of differential fiscal capacities or effort made by 
state governments and also due to variation in needs of the states. Thus an 
important feature of Indian fiscal federalism is the wide inter-State differences 
in revenue capacity and consequently, per capita expenditures. There are 17 
relatively more homogenous general category States, but even these have wide 
differences in size, revenue raising capacities, efforts, expenditure levels and 
fiscal dependence on the Centre. In addition, in terms of economic 
characteristics the 11 mountainous States of the North and the Northeast differ 
markedly from the rest and therefore are considered 'special category' States. 
Of the 28, three States have been carved out form three large States. ^ ^ 
Table 3.2 
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Selected Fiscal Indicators of States: 2006-07 
States 
Andhra Pradesh 
Bihar 
Chhatisgarh 
Goa 
Gujarat 
Haryana 
Tharkhand 
Kamataka 
Kerala 
Madhya Pradesh 
Maharashtra 
Orissa 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Tamil Nadu 
Uttar Pradesh 
West Bengal 
General category state 
Arunachal Pradesh 
Assam 
Himachal Pradesh 
Jammu & Kashmir 
Manipur 
Meghalaya 
Mizoram 
Nagaland 
Sikkim 
Tripura 
Uttarakhand 
Avg: Special Category 
States 
Avg: All States 
Per capita 
GSDP 
32533.0 
10286.0 
26125.1 
95663.5 
44332.5 
48213.8 
23591.2 
36037.8 
39742.1 
18984.1 
46307.9 
25997.6 
43436.1 
22210.8 
37635.2 
16308.2 
30739.3 
28867.0 
27747.5 
21947.7 
43535.4 
26334.2 
27992.3 
28342.6 
27820.5 
27740.1 
34820.6 
29500.1 
30956.0 
27189.0 
28762.5 
Per capita 
Dev. Exp. 
4977.2 
2105.3 
4439.6 
15460.0 
4558.4 
5717.8 
3992.0 
5173.7 
4243.7 
2872.0 
4587.2 
2649.9 
4885.9 
3201.1 
4698.3 
2368.9 
2419.5 
3606.4 
16941.7 
4579.9 
7541.5 
8067.3 
9821.7 
7399.5 
16250.0 
9209.1 
22764.5 
6600.6 
6426.9 
6729.8 
1962.0 
Per capita 
own 
revenue 
3788.0 
530.9 
2974.4 
9446.7 
4056.2 
5736.0 
1542.9 
4567.3 
3841.6 
1863.2 
4235.6 
1945.3 
4362.7 
2301.3 
4729.4 
1607.7 
1598.7 
2790.6 
2316.7 
1793.1 
3690.8 
2279.1 
1195.7 
1772.5 
1820.0 
918.2 
4488.1 
1247.1 
3203.2 
2197.1 
1421.2 
Per capita 
transaction 
1768.1 
1952.9 
2279.7 
2886.7 
1433.1 
1008.9 
1888.3 
1733.4 
1773.4 
1841.9 
1383.3 
2568.5 
1612.2 
1735.7 
1454.0 
1631.9 
1550.0 
1691.0 
17625.0 
3749.5 
6996.9 
8611.8 
11795.7 
8102.9 
18100.0 
11545.5 
21177.5 
8108.8 
4154.6 
6375.8 
1023.9 
Tax 
GSDP 
percentage 
9.6 
4.8 
9.0 
8.3 
7.5 
9.3 
4.5 
11.7 
9.0 
8.0 
8.2 
5.7 
8.5 
8.1 
11.4 
8.1 
4.8 
8.3 
2.1 
5.6 
5.4 
6.6 
1.7 
3.8 
2.3 
1.9 
6.4 
3.5 
8.2 
5.6 
8.1 
Source : Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, December 2007, 
Public Fmance Statistics, Ministry of Finance, Govt, of India, 2006-07. 
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Differences in per capita revenues and expenditures among the States 
bring out several important features. First, there are wide inter-State variations 
in revenues in both per capita terms and as a ratio of Gross State Domestic 
Products (GSDP). Second, these variations indicate differences in revenue 
capacity, and partly, differences in revenue efforts. Third, the tax-GSDP ratios 
in the special category States are lower than in the general category States even 
when their per capita GSDP is higher. Fourth, although the revenue bases in the 
special category States are low, their average per capita current expenditure are 
higher than not only the all-State average but also the average of high income 
States. Fifth, in the case of general category States, the fiscal dependence on 
the Centre is not only high but also varies inversely with per capita income. It 
is seen that per capita development expenditures in 'special category' States 
was higher than the all State average by 29 per cent and that of the 'General 
category' States is lower by 54 per cent. 
The inter-State disparities in India even among the general category 
States are not only high, but also have shown an increasing trend. In 1980-91, 
the per capita SDP in the richest State, Punjab (Rs. 2674) was about 2.9 times 
that of the poorest, Bihar (Rs. 919). In 2006-07, this difference increased to 4.2 
times with per capita GSDPs of the two States respectively at Rs. 43436.1 and 
Rs. 10286.0. It is also seen that per capita income levels have tended to diverge 
sharply after market based reforms were initiated. As inter-state differences in 
the ability to raise revenues increased over the years, and as federal transfers 
did not entirely offset the fiscal disabilities of the poorer states.^ ^ 
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III.5 Intergovernmental Transfers 
Inter-governmental transfers have been employed to fulfil a variety of 
objective and the design of the transfer scheme depends on the purpose for 
which it is given. The two major approaches for federal fiscal transfers are 
equalization and efficiency. The application of efficiency and equity principles 
results in four main economic reasons for grants viz. (i) inter-jurisdictional spill 
overs, (ii) fiscal gap (iii) minimum standards of services and (iv) differential 
net fiscal benefits across states. Fiscal transfer, in the form of tax devolution 
and grants, are meant to correct both the vertical and horizontal imbalances. 
Correcting vertical imbalance relates to transfers fi-om the central government 
to the State governments taken together, whereas the correction of horizontal 
imbalance is concerned with the allocation of transfers among the state 
governments. Thus Inter-governmental transfers have been used as an 
important instrument of keeping the country together, enabling the sub-central 
units to pursue their own goals while influencing their priorities through 
conditionalities.'^  
in.5.1 Volume and Composition: Central transfers constitute a 
significance part of state finances as shown in Table 3.3. Gross devolution and 
transfers (GDT) comprising share in Central taxes, grants-in-aid and gross 
loans fi-om Centre have increased steadily over the past two decades. Gross 
devolution and transfers (GDT) is budgeted to be 5.8 per cent of GDP m 2007-
08. On an average, the ratio of GDT to GDP during the first three years of 
Twelfth Finance Commission (2005-08) was higher at 5.5 per cent than the 
Eleventh Finance Commission period (5.2 per cent). Gross devolution and 
transfers constituted around 33 per cent of aggregate disbursements and 
aggregate receipts of the states during 2005-08. Therefore, current transfers, 
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including Finance Commission transfers and non-statutory grants, constituted 
almost 95 per cent of GDT in recent years. The grants from the Planning 
Commission and other Central Ministries constitute around 35 per cent of the 
total GDT in India. After the Twelfth Finance Commission's (TFC) 
recommendations, the assistance is confined to grants and the Central loans 
given to states for plan purposes have been discontinued since 2005-06. Finally 
various Ministries give grants to their counterparts in the states for specified 
projects (Central Sector and Centrally Sponsored Schemes).^ / V^*^ ^ '^-^. 
>, 
Table3.3 |^', •-^yT^-'CJ^Ry 
Composition of Central Transfers to State§=j^ ?^^ JJ^ u^ e^ *^ ^^  
(Rs. Billions) 
Plan periods/ 
years 
Finance Commission transfers 
Tax 
devolution 
Grants Total 
Plan Grants 
State 
plan 
scheme 
Central 
scheme 
Total 
Other 
total 
Total 
Fourth Plan 
(1969-74) 
45.60 
(54.35) 
8.60 
(10.25) 
54.20 
(64.60) 
10.80 
(12.87) 
9.70 
(11.56) 
20.50 
(24.43) 
9.30 
(11.08) 
83.90 
(100.00) 
Fifth Plan 
(1974-79) 
82.70 
(50.21) 
28.20 
(17.12) 
110.90 
(67.33) 
29.10 
(17.67) 
19.30 
(11.72) 
48.40 
(29.39) 
5.40 
(3.28) 
164.70 
(100.00) 
Sixth Plan 
(1980-85) 
237.30 
(56.97) 
21.40 
(5.14) 
258.70 
(62.11) 
73.80 
(17.72) 
69.00 
(16.57) 
142.80 
(34.29) 
15.10 
(3.63) 
416.50 
(100.00) 
Seventh Plan 
(1985-90) 
494.60 
(54.17) 
62.70 
(6.87) 
557.40 
(61.04) 
155.20 
(17.00) 
165.10 
(18.08) 
320.30 
(35.08) 
35.20 
(3.85) 
913.10 
(100.00) 
Annual Plan 
(1991-92) 
172.00 
(52.22) 
34.50 
(10.47) 
206.40 
(62.66) 
57.20 
(17.36) 
55.40 
(16.82) 
112.50 
(34.15) 
10.20 
(3.10) 
329.40 
(100.00) 
Eight Plan 
(1992-97) 
1318.50 
(55.56) 
147.20 
(6.20) 
1465.70 
(61.76) 
483.40 
(20.37) 
364.70 
(15.37) 
848.40 
(35.75) 
58.40 
(2.46) 
2373.10 
(100.00) 
Ninth Plan 
(1997-2002) 
7269.71 
(58.71) 
230.44 
(5.96) 
2499.45 
(64.67) 
772.24 
(19.98) 
407.79 
(10.55) 
1046.59 
(27.08) 
189.25 
(4.90) 
3864.73 
(100.00) 
Tenth plan 
(2002-06) 
4026.44 
(53.24) 
651.85 
(8.62) 
4678.29 
(61.86) 
1531.69 
(20.35) 
893.19 
(11.81) 
2424.88 
(32.06) 
459.42 
(6.07) 
7562.59 
(100.00) 
Note: 
Source 
Figures in parenthesis are percentage to total transfers. 
State Finances - A Study of Budget (various years), Reserve Bank of 
Bulletin, Finance Account of States Govemments( various years). 
India 
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The trends in the relative shares of the three channels of Central 
transfers to states since the fourth five-year plan, as shown in Table 3.3, bring 
out some interesting features. First, the share of Finance Commission transfers 
in the total declined fi-om 65 per cent during the fourth plan 1969-74 to a little 
over 62 per cent during the eighth plan. Although it increased to 65 per cent in 
the ninth plan, in Tenth plan, it was lower at 62 per cent. Second, the 
proportion of formula based transfers given by the Finance Commission and 
the Planning Commission has declined and that of discretionary transfers has 
increased in recent years. The share of grants given under the Central sector 
and Centrally Sponsored Schemes increased from 11.5 per cent during the 
Fourth Plan to 16.8 per cent in 1990-91 before declining to about 11.8 per cent 
in Tenth Plan (2002-07). However, there has been a steady increase in 
assistance in State Plan Schemes from 13 per cent in the Fourth Plan period to 
20 per cent in the Ninth Plan and in Tenth Plan was 20.3 per cent. More 
importantly, until 1991-92, the assistance under State Plan Schemes was 
predominantly formula based as 80 per cent of the grants was given according 
to formula divised by National Development Council (NDC). In subsequent 
years, however, the discretionary component of these transfers has shown a 
steady increase with the infroduction of assistance to schemes such as 
accelerated irrigation, accelerated power development, Rashtriya Sam Vikas 
Yojana, Prime Minister's Gramodaya Yojana, roads and bridges and advanced 
central assistance to externally aided projects. The normal assistance to state 
plans given under the Gadgil formula declined from 85 per cent of State Plan 
assistance in 1991-92 to 27.5 per cent in 2008-09.^ ^ 
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III.5.2 Finance Commission Transfers: The Finance Commission, an 
important provision in the Constitution, acts as regulating machinery in the 
flow of "resources from the Centre to the states. The principles and the basis of 
tax assignment and tax sharing to the State from the Union government are 
determined by the Finance Commission constituted by an order of the President 
under Article 280 of the Indian Constitution. The major tasks of the Finance 
Commission are to recommend: 
(a) The distribution of proceeds from Central taxes between the Centre and 
States and among the States inter-se. 
> 
(b) Grants-in-aid to be given to the States, out of the Consolidated Fund of 
India for the States, in need of assistance under Article 275; 
(c) Measures needed to augment the Consolidated Fund of the States to 
supplement the resources of urban and rural local bodies on the basis of 
recommendation made by the State Finance Commission; 
(d) Any other matter referred to the Commission in the interest of sound 
finance; 
(e) A number of directives have been given to every Commission, which 
have often raised controversies. 
The approach of the Finance Commissions' to transfers consists of (i) 
assessment of overall budgetary requirements of the Centre and States to 
determine the volume of resources that can be transferred during the period of 
their recommendation; (ii) forecasting States' own current revenues and non-
plan current expenditures; (iii) determining the States' share in Central tax 
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revenues and distributing between the States of these shareable proceeds; (iv) 
filling the post -devolution projected gaps between non-plan current 
expenditures and revenues with the grants in aid. This is known as the "gap-
filling" approach.'^ " 
Prior to the enactment of the Constitution (80* Amendment) Act, 2000, 
two main Central taxes were shared with the States, viz. income tax excluding 
corporation tax and Union excise duties. The sharing of the income tax was 
mandatory, while that of the Union excise duties was discretionary. All central 
taxes were brought into a shareable pool and it become mandatory to assign a 
share from each central tax to the states, except taxes imder Article 268 and 
269, earmarked cesses, and surcharge under article 271. 
In its recommendations regarding tax devolution, the Twelfth Finance 
Commission enhanced the aggregate share of state to 30.5 per cent form 29.5 
per cent in Eleventh Finance Commission, as long the existing arrangements 
regarding the additional excise duties on textiles and tobacco continue. The 
TFC has also altered the weights on which the sharing of taxes is to be 
determined across States, as shown by table 3.4. The weight of the distance 
formula was reduced to 50 per cent and infrastructure index was dropped. The 
TFC has increased fiscal performance to 15 per cent with 7.5 per cent each for 
tax effort and fiscal discipline.^  ^  
The Twelfth Finance Commission has recommended a total transfer of Rs. 
755751.62 crore to State during 2005-10. Out of this, share of cenfral taxes and 
duties would be Rs. 613112 crore, while the grant-in-aid would amount of Rs. 
142,639 crore. As against Rs. 440209 crore of total transfers by U"' Finance 
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Commission for the five years period 2000-05, showing an increase of 71.68% 
over TFC award period. 
Table 3.4 
Tax Devolution : Factors Determining Inter-se Shares 
Factors 
Population 
Income (Distance Method) 
Area 
Index of Infrastructure 
Tax effort 
Fiscal discipline 
Total 
Weights 
EFC 
10 
62.5 
7.5 
7.5 
5.0 
7.5 
100.0 
TFC 
25 
50 
10 
0.0 
7.5 
7.5 
100.0 
Source : Reports of Twelfth Finance Commission (2005-10), Nov. 2004, Government 
of India. 
An important feature of the tax deovlution recommended by the Finance 
Commissions is that, while the criteria adopted for distribution are different 
from the principles of grants-in-aid, nowhere is it made clear that the economic 
objectives of the two instruments are different. The tax devolution is 
recommended mainly on the basis of general economic indicators and grants 
are given to offset the residuary fiscal disadvantages of the States as quantified 
by the Commissions. Further, assigning weights to contradictory factors like 
'backwardness' and 'contribution' in the same formula has rendered the 
achievement of the overall objective of offsetting revenue and cost disabilities 
difficult. 
Over the years, attempts have been made to improve degree of 
equalization in the transfer scheme by assigning higher weight to per capita 
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SDP either in the "inverse' or "distance" form by the successive Commissions. 
Yet, population has continued to receive the largest implicit and explicit 
weight, though the last Commission has significantly reduced explicit weight to 
this factor. Equally important is the unreliability of tax effort and index of 
fiscal discipline. In a tax system, which is predominantly origin based, there 
can be significant inter-state tax exportation and the tax effort indicator ignores 
this phenomenon. Besides, there are a number of other factors in addition to per 
capita SDP that determines taxable capacity of a State. The changes in the 
ratios of own revenues to revenue expenditures relative to all-State average and 
their changes over time can occur due to factors totally extraneous to States 
own efforts at fiscal discipline. Equalization has been further blunted by the 
terms of reference, which require the Commissions to use the 1971 population 
figures wherever it is used in the transfer formula. The purpose of this is to 
penalize the States with higher population growth rates. The important 
questions are first, whether, the federal transfer mechanism should be 
employed as an instrument of population policy and second, even if it is, why 
should those States with high population growth due to migration be 
penalized.^ ^ 
The 'gap-filling' approach outlined above has been subjected to 
criticisms. First, none of the Finance Commissions assessed the overall 
resource position and requirements of the Centre on any objective basis. 
Second, the transfers made by the Finance Commissions were not designed 
specifically to offset fiscal disadvantages of the States arising from lower 
revenue raising capacity and the higher unit cost of public services. While the 
tax devolution is determined on the basis of general economic indicators, grants 
are given on the basis of projected post-devolution budgetary gaps. The 
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introduction of backwardness factor in tax devolution has had the effect of 
equalization, but the transfer system is not specifically targetted to fiscally 
disadvantaged states. Finally, it is argued that the "gap-filling" methodology 
has led to both inequity and disincentives for fiscal management in states. 
There has been a considerable concern at the Finance Commission's 
following the "gap-filling" approach and its possible disincentives on fiscal 
management in States. This was the reason for modifying the terms of 
reference of the Ninth Finance Commission to follow a "normative approach". 
The Commission did develop methodology for the purpose. However, the 
subsequent Commissions simply abandoned the approach. The 11* finance 
Commission in the additional terms of reference given to it just before the 
finalization of its recommendations was asked to "draw a monitorable fiscal 
reforms program aimed at reduction of revenue deficit of the state and 
recommended the manner in which the grants to the States to cover the 
assessed deficit in their non-plan revenue account may be linked to progress in 
implementing the program". 
The Commission recommended a scheme of pooling 15 per cent of 
revenue deficit grants and adding an equal amount to it to create an incentive 
fund and distributing the fund based on fulfilling the required reduction in the 
ratio of revenue deficits to total revenue receipts of the states.^ ^ 
The TFC which examined the scheme recommended to discontinuation of 
the scheme due to its design problem. It continued the "gap-filling" approach 
and sought to incentivise the system by linking debt restructuring scheme to 
passing of the fiscal responsibility and Budgetary management Act (FRBMA) 
and write off loan repayable to the Central government during the ensuing five 
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years (2005-10) to reduction in revenue deficits. The equity built into the tax 
devolution formula, the assessment of revenues and expenditure along with 
upgradation grants for education and healthcare are supposed to take care of 
24 
equity. 
III.5.3 Planning Commission Transfers: The Planning Commission m 
India was set up in 1950 by an administrative order of the Government of 
India. The Prime Minister is the Chairman of the Planning Commission, which 
works under the overall guidance of the National Development Council. The 
Deputy Chairman and the fiiU time Members of the Commission, as a 
composite body, provide advice and guidance to the subject division for 
formulation of Five Year Plan, Annual Plans, State Plans, Monitoring Plan 
Programmes, Projects and Schemes. The 1950 resolution setting up the 
Planning Commission outlined its functions as to : 
(a) Make an assessment of the material, capital and human resources of the 
country, including technical personnel, and investigate the possibilities of 
augmenting such of these resources as are found to be deficient in relation 
to the nation's requirement; 
(b) Formulate a plan for the most effective and balanced utilization of 
country's resources; 
(c) On a determination of priorities, define the stages in which the plan 
should be carried out and propose the allocation of resources for the due 
completion of each stage; 
(d) Indicate the factors which are tending to retard economic development, 
and determine the conditions which, in view of the current social and 
political situation, should be established for the successful execution of 
the plan. 
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(e) Appraise from time to time the progress achieved in the execution of each 
stage of the plan and recommend the adjustment of policy and measures. 
The Planning Commission oversees allocation of resources in the form 
of loan and grants meant for developmental expenditure of the states. The 
relative ratio of loans and grants are different for the special category states as 
compared to the general category. For the 'general category' states, assistance 
is 30 per cent grant and 70 per cent loan. For the special category states, 90 per 
cent of assistance is given as grant and 10 per cent as loan. 
In earlier years, both the volume and the loan-grant component was 
project based, but since 1969 the assistance has been allocated on the basis of a 
formula (Gadgil formula). This formula was modified in 1980, in order to make 
it more progressive in the dkection of removal of inter-state disparities. 
Table 3.5 
Formula for Distributing State Plan Assistance 
Variable 
Population (1971) 
Per capita SDP, of which, 
(i) Deviation from the average to the States below 
average per capita SDP 
(ii) 'Distance' from the highest per capita SDP for all the 
general category States. 
Fiscal Performance, of which, 
(i) Tax effort 
(ii) Fiscal management 
(iii) National objectives 
(iv) Special problems 
Total 
Weight 
60.0 
25.0 
20.0 
5.0 
7.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
100.0 
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At present, 30 per cent of the funds is kept apart for the special category 
States and distributed among them on the basis of plan projects formulated by 
them, 90 per cent of the assistance given by way of grants and the remainder as 
loans. The 70 per cent of the funds available to the major States is distributed 
with 60 per cent weight assigned to population, 25 per cent to per capita SDP, 
7.5 per cent to fiscal management and the remaining 7.5 per cent to special 
problems of these states. 30 per cent of the resources is given by way of grants 
and the remainder as loans. Thus, plan transfers and their grant-loan 
components, are determined independently of the required plan investments, 
their sectoral composition, the resources available to the State or their fiscal 
performances. The TFC however recommended the discontinuation of central 
loans to states and fi:om 2005-06, the central assistance for plan consists of only 
grants and the states are required to raise balance resources from the market.^ ^ 
III.5.4 Assistance to the Centrally Sponsored Schemes: This is the third 
component of transfer and is given for specified purposes with or without 
matching provisions. Grants for the Central sector schemes are given to the 
States to execute Central projects and are entirely funded by it. Centrally 
sponsored schemes, on the other hand, are shared cost programs falling with 
the States' ambit with uniform matching ratios across the States, but, varying 
with the projects. There are more than 200 schemes at present, and some more 
have been added in subsequent years. These transfers have attracted the 
sharpest criticism due to their discretionary nature and conditionality attached 
to them. They accounted for about 33 per cent of the total plan assistance and 
about 12 per cent of total current transfers were given to these schemes in 
Tenth Plan (2002-07). 
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III.5.5 Financing infrastructure at the State level: The loans 
Borrowing is an important source of financing infrastructure at the state 
level. Until 19.87-88, the government savings at the State level did contribute to 
financing capital expenditures. Since then, however, with increasing dissavings 
at the state level, the borrowing is used not only to finance capital expenditures, 
but also a significant part of current expenditures of the States. In 1998-99 for 
example, almost one-half of the States' borrowing is used to finance capital 
expenditure. The States' liabilities consist of Central government loans, market 
borrowings, share of small savings collections, and provident funds, deposit 
accounts etc. 
The States can also borrow from the market. However, if a State is 
indebted to the Centre, it has to take central permission before borrowing. As 
all the States are indebted to the Centre, the Ministry of Finance, Planning 
Commission and the Reserve Bank of India determine market borrowings of 
the States. In determining the volume of market borrowings, volume of 
repayments, the plan investments decided upon and the volume of indebtedness 
of each of the states is taken account of. 
III.6. Fiscal Decentralization to the Local Governments 
The 73 and 74 Amendments of the Constitution have been a major 
steps towards strengthening the local governments and operationalising the 
decentralization process. Every state had enacted suitable legislation for 
devolution of fiinctions, power and responsibilities to local bodies, including 
the power to raise resources. The Constitutional changes, however, envisage 
the panchayats and municipalities as institutions of self-governments. It has 
been made mandatory, under the Constitution to hold regular elections to these 
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bodies under the supervision of the State Election Commissions. 
Representation of SCs/STs and women has been made obligatory. The 
devolution of financial resources to these bodies has been ensured through 
periodic constitution of the State Finance Commission that are required to 
make recommendations on the sharing and assignment of various taxes, duties, 
tolls, fees etc. and grant-in-aid to these bodies from the consolidated fund of 
the states. 
Regarding the functional and fiscal powers, the Amendments incorporated 
two schedules to the constitution: Eleventh Schedule contains a subject list of 
29 entries for rural bodies, while Twelfth Schedule contains a subject list of 18 
entries for urban bodies. Both subject lists relate to economic and social 
reconstruction and uplift including planning at the local level. The two 
Schedule by themselves do not contain subjects of revenue resources except by 
way of incidental receipts. 
The taxes, duties, tools and fees to be levied by them and assigned to 
them, and the grant-in-aid to be given to them are left to the discretion of the 
State Governments. Therefore local bodies have become more spending 
agencies, always dependent upon the state, centre and their various schemes to 
meet the need on given subjects.^ ^ The relative roles of centre, state and local 
governments in urban and rural areas in raising revenues and incurring 
expenditure presented in table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6 
Revenue of different levels of Government 
(Per cent of GDP) 
Level of 
Government 
Centre 
States 
Local urban 
Local rural 
Total 
1997-98 
Revenue 
collection 
11.4 
6.3 
0.5 
0.04 
18.3 
Revenue 
accrual 
6.8 
10.9 
2.1 
0.8 
19.8 
2002-03 
Revenue 
collection 
11.8 
6.7 
0.3 
0.07 
18.87 
Revenue 
accrual 
7.74 
9.63 
0.51 
0.98 
18.86 
Note : Revenue collection represents own Revenue. 
Revenue Accrual includes revenue from assigned taxes, share in taxes and 
grants from higher levels of government. 
Source : Public Finance Statistics, 2005-06, Ministry of Finance, Govt, of India. 
Report of Eleventh & Twelfth Finance Commission, Govt, of India. 
The revenues raised by urban local bodies from the sources assigned to 
them vi^ as just about 0.5 per cent of GDP in 1997-98, declined to 0.3 per cent of 
GDP in 2002-03. As against this, the revenue raised by rural local bodies as 
ratio of GDP increased from 0.04 per cent in 1997-98 to 0.07 per cent in 2002-
03. As far as revenue accruing are concerned, the urban bodies collected 2.1 
per cent of GDP in 1997-98 which declined to 0.51 in 2002-03. On the other 
hand revenue accrued to rural local bodies increase from 0.8 per cent of GDP 
in 1997-98 to 0.98 per cent of GDP in 2002-03. 
Irrespective of the trend what these estimate show is that despite all the 
emphasis on decentralization, local governments play abysmally small part in 
public service provision and the principle reason for this has to be found in the 
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negligible revenue mobilization from them. State-level finance commissions 
have been formed to recommend the ways to identify resources for carrying out 
these functions by local governments. Fiscal provisions for the local 
governments vary across states in accordance with the recommendations of the 
respective State Finance Commissions (SFCs). 
The EFC recommended a total grant of Rs. 1,600 crores for the PRIs and 
Rs. 400 crores for the ULBs for each of the five years starting from 2000-01. 
The TFC has further raised this grant to Rs. 20,000 crores for the PRIs and Rs. 
5,000 crores for the ULBs. 
The basic purpose of the devolution of grants to rural local bodies was to 
improve the level of services in respect of water supply and sanitation. On the 
other hand in the case of urban bodies, the commission emphasized that there is 
need to encourage the concept of public private partnership for improving the 
mechanism of service delivery with respect to solid waste management, it has 
recommended 50 per cent of the grant allocated for this purpose. The 
Commission has also recommended that 50 per cent of grant should be 
earmarked for data base and maintenance of accounts.'^ " 
The preceding analysis brings out the important features of federal fiscal 
arrangements in India. The transfer system despite achieving as measure of 
equalization and attempts to impart objectivity to the system, has left a lot of 
room for improvement in terms of both equity and incentives. It is therefore 
necessary to redesign the transfer system to improve accountability, incentives 
and equity. In particular, there are serious disincentives involved in the 'gap-
filling' approach the Commissions have adopted. Reforms in the transfer 
system will have to begin with redefinmg the scope of Planning and Finance 
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Commissions to avoid, overlap in their roles. Preferably, the entire transfers 
should be the responsibility of the Finance Commission and the Planning 
Commission should focus on physical infrastructure. 
The transfer system from the Centre to the states has inherent moral 
hazard problems. Multiple agencies making transfers, makes it difficult to 
target the transfer system to meet the objectives of transfers. The gap-filling 
role adopted by the Finance Commissions has only confributed to fiscal 
indiscipline. 
Despite weaknesses, the Central transfers are generally equalizing. The 
major contributor to equalization is Finance Commission transfer. The 
Planning Commission transfer and assistance given to Centrally Sponsored 
Schemes are not equalizing. Despite the overall equalizing impact, per capita 
expenditure of States is positively related to taxable capacity. 
In spite of constitutional recognition to the third tier, the local 
governments seem to play a very limited role both in raising revenues and in 
spending. It is necessary to understand the policies and institutions necessary 
for the success to make the local fiscal governance successful. 
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CHAPTER-rV 
FINANCING OF PANCHAYATI RAJ INSTITUTIONS 
rV.l Introduction 
The political and economic rationals of increased political 
responsiveness and participation at the local level, allocative efficiency of 
public spending reflecting local needs, higher competitiveness of local 
governments leading to better innovation and increased willingness to pay for 
local services, have led many countries towards decentralization. Therefore, a 
new realization of the unportance of local government finance has been 
relatively recently experienced in many countries. In many countries, national 
governments are increasingly shifting functions to local governments in the 
assumption that additional local resources can be mobilized. In most countries, 
local governments play an important role in the provision and utilization of 
local public infi'astructure and local public servies.^  
The financing of local services has serious implications for national 
development patterns as well as for political accountability and administrative 
efficiency. Interestingly, many local services are still to be fmanced to a 
considerable extent by transfers of resources from Central or state 
governments. The optimum role and structure of local government finance for 
any country depends upon the actual and potential role to be played by 
alternative modes of providing local services and their financing. Local 
government expenditure is important in aggregate term in some countries. 
Significantly, local public utilities are responsible for such essential services as 
water supply, sewerage, electricity supply, public transit, housing and roads. 
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Local government also provide local streets and a variety of related services 
including refiise removal and disposal, streets lighting and streets cleaning. 
Moreover, they are also responsible for providing social services such as 
primary education, health care, poverty alleviation and social assistance. 
The 73"* and 74* Amendments to the Indian Constitution, envisage that 
the panchayats and municipalities are institutions of self-government. As 
regards the panchayats are concerned, the State Legislature is requured under 
Article 243 G of the Constitution to transfer such powers, functions and 
responsibilities as to enable them to function as institutions of self-government. 
The Eleventh Schedule to the Constitution specifies the devolution of 29 
subjects to the PRIs. The panchayats may be required to prepare plans for 
economic development and social justice, and implement the schemes relating 
to the subjects listed in the XI Schedule. The resources of PRIs fall under four 
categories: tax revenue, non tax revenue, grant from Central and state 
government and local contributions. The panchayats have power to levy taxes 
like house tax, entertairmient tax, vehicle tax, profession tax, land tax, water 
and electricity tax etc. Panchayats also raise money from economic enterprises 
like common land, village forests, etc. Though the sources of PRIs are many, 
the major portion of the total revenue consists of grants in aid by Central and 
state governments, which is for the implementation of plan schemes. But the 
last decade has been very tightfisted approach to fiscal decentralization, even 
while the expenditure of panchayats was considerably increased. The 
panchayats do not have enough money to carry out the functions assigned to 
them in the Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution.^  These institutions should 
not only have the power to raise resources but also the right to use the funds as 
per their need and priorities. The resources available from their own sources 
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and those devolved should match the functions and responsibilities entrusted. 
In the absence of these, the PRIs have become more spending agencies, always 
dependent upon the State, Centre and their various schemes to meet the need on 
given subjects. As autonomous institutions, they are expected to make 
provisions for core service and infrastructure development such as road, 
electricity, water supply, sanitation, etc. undertake various development 
initiatives in the area of education, health and employment generation, maintain 
assets and services and make other administrative over heads. Thus the 
responsibility of making the PRIs fiscally autonomous and stronger lies with 
both state and central government. This would only when the panchayats have 
adequate funds to provide public services assigned to them. The Finance 
Commission is to make recommendation on the distribution between the union 
and the state of the net proceeds of taxes, allocation between the study, the 
principle which should govern the grant-in-aid of the revenue of the states out 
of the consolidated fiind of India etc. the state legislations is also required to 
appoint a state finance commission (SFC) to make recommendation as the 
sharing and assignment of various taxes, duties, toll, fee, etc. and on the grant-
in-aid to be given to the panchayats from the Consolidated Fund of the state. To 
strengthen the PRIs and to give them more fiscal autonomy, the panchayats 
should be able to raise tax and non-tax revenues firom the sources assigned to 
them or higher level governments should provide unconditional transfers by 
way of share in taxes or block grants."* 
Section II deals with the decentralization of powers and functions to 
panchayats and explains the role of district planning committee, its 
constitutional provision and structure. Section III analyses the powers and 
functions transfer to panchayast. Section IV discusses financing to panchayats 
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analyses its incomes and expenditure and role of Central and States Finance 
Commission, Centrally Sponsored Schemes. Section V deals with functionaries 
and last explained the reforming rural fiscal decentralization in India. 
IV.2 Decentralization of Powers and Functions 
The Constitution of India has demarcated the responsibilities/functions 
of the centre and states in three distinct lists under the Seventh Schedule. 
Similarly, the ftmctions of the panchayati raj institutions have been clearly spelt 
out in Article 243G of the Constitution, read with Article 243ZD and the U"* 
Schedule. The Eleventh Schedule to the constitution specifies the devolution of 
subjects to the PRIs. In fact the Article should have been like this "the 
legislature of a state should, by law, endow the panchayats with such powers 
and authority as shall be necessary to enable them to function as institution of 
self government and should contain provision for the devolution of powers and 
responsibilities upon panchayats at the appropriate level with respect to: 
a. The preparation of plans for economic development and social justice. 
b. The implementation of scheme for economic development and social 
justice as may be interested to them including those in relation to the 
matters listed in the 11^ schedule.^  
Keeping in view the spirit of the 11^ Schedule almost all state's Acts 
have devolved some powers and function to panchayats. As a result, village 
panchayats have been given more powers, function and functionaries. These 
are ideally united to perform functions such as public facilities, roads, housing 
drinking water, electrification, sanitation along with social culture, women and 
child development and family welfare due to their durect and close proximity to 
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the people, especially were people's initiative support and participation would 
play a crucial role. The panchayat samities of PRIs can perform functions 
relating to planning and implementation of block level development 
programme and also take up civic functions, which are common to village's 
under its jurisdiction. But panchayat samities are highly dependent on state 
grants, most of their expenses are on salaries. The smaller states have been 
allowed to drop this level of government. The district panchayats seems to be 
an ideal unit for performing function relating to planning, co-ordinating, 
supervision, review and monitoring of all programmes and taking up common 
programmes involving more than one panchayat union. The functions of 
panchayats have been grouped under obligatory, discretionary and functions 
entrusted by the state governments.^  The functions which are under article 
243G given below: 
Eleventh Schedule (Article 243G) 
1. Agriculture, including agricultural extension. 
2. Land improvement implementation of land reforms land consolidation 
and soil conservation. 
3. Minor irrigation, water management and watershed development 
4. Animal husbandry, dairying and poultry. . ^v^^V^-^-^^s^w 
5. Fisheries /V^ V ' ^ 
6. Social forestry and farm forestry i ^ i /^oci>§,^-^ R-^-JJ 
7. Minor forest produce "^ :C4 xT^^-^^-^'^-f • 
8. Small scale industry, including food processing mdustries 
9. Khadi, village and cottage industries 
10. Rural housing 
11. Drinking water 
12. Fuel and fodder 
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13. Roads, culverts, bridges, terries, waterways and other means of 
communication. 
14. Rural electrification 
15. Non-conventional energy sources 
16. Poverty alleviation programme 
17. Education including primary and secondary schools 
18. Technical training and vocational education 
19. Adult and non formal education 
20. Libraries 
21. Cultural activities 
22. Markets and fairs 
23. Health and sanitation, including hospitals, primary health centres and 
dispensaries. 
24. Family welfare 
25. Women and child development 
26. Social welfare, including welfare of the handicapped and mentally 
retarded. 
27. Welfare of weaker section and in particular of the scheduled caste and 
schedule tribes. 
28. Public distribution system 
29. Maintenance of community assets. 
There is considerably difference between what is intended to law and 
how it is implemented. By all accounts, the States has been reluctant to devolve 
powers to local governments. However, only eight states and one union 
territory have transferred all the 29 functions or subjects to the PRIs. Arunachal 
Pradesh, Chandigarh, Pondicherry have not developed any function to 
panchayats. States sucH as Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab, Tamil 
Nadu, Uttar Pradesh have developed few functions without matching 
devolution of funds. We note that only Kerala, Kamataka and West Bengal 
have completed activity mapping, as envisaged in the 73'"'* Amendment.' Table 
4.1 shows that while some progress has been made, there is need for 
expenditing the process. 
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Table 4.1 
State-wise Comparison of Funds and Functional Devolution 
State 
Andhra Pradesh 
Arunachal Pradesh 
Assam 
Bihar 
Chattisgarh 
Goa 
Gujarat 
Haryana 
Himachal Pradesh 
Jharkhand 
Kamataka 
Kerala 
Maharashtra 
Madhya Pradesh 
Manipur 
Orissa 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
SikJdm 
Tamil Nadu 
Uttar Pradesh 
Uttaranchal 
West Bengal 
D&NHaveli 
Pondicherry 
Chandigarh 
Functions 
developed 
17 
-
29 
25 
29 
6 
15 
29 
26 
-
29 
26 
18 
23 
22 
25 
7 
29 
28 
29 
12 
14 
29 
29 
0 
-
Functions for which 
funds also devolved 
9 
3 
29 
25 
27 
18 
14 
10 
0 
-
29 
26 
0 
23 
22 
7 
0 
12 
28 
-
0 
9 
15 
29 
0 
Source : Mid-Term Report, Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India, 
November, 2006. 
But PRIs have little control over funds and functionaries. Most of these 
transfers, however, remain on paper without the support of adequate funding 
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and functionaries. Most of the functions listed in the XI Schedule are shared 
between the departments and the PRIs and there is no clear demarcation on the 
functional domain of the two. The functions devolved to panchayat have not 
been deleted from the list of line departments. Many functions related 
agriculture, fisheries, minor irrigation, provision of drinking water, primary 
education, khadi and village industries are shared between the line departments 
and the PRIs. Similarly, many functions are shared between two or three tier of 
PRIs. The control over functionary and finances has remained with 
departments. The generic nature of devolution and overlaps with department, 
DRDA, DPC and other agencies make the process of functional devolution 
meaningless. These, in turn, have not only adversely affected the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the panchayats but also not enabled them to prepare plan for 
economic development and social justice on envisaged by the constitution. For 
any devolution of function to be meaningful, it must be accompanied by the 
devolution of functionaries and flinds. To this end, the essential step is to 
undertake activity mapping relating to devolved functions with a view to 
attributing each activity to the appropriate level of panchayat, keeping in mind 
the principle of subsidiary.^  The First Round Table in Kolkata that all states and 
UTs would undertake activity mapping by the end of March, 2005, using the 
activity mapping model as evolved in the Ministry of Rural Development in the 
report of the Task Force on devolution of powers and functions upon 
panchayati raj institutions, seeking if need be, technical expertise from the 
union Ministry of Panchayati Raj. ^ 
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IV.3 District Planning Committee: Constitution and Structure 
As per the Constitution, Article 243 ZD creates committees for District 
Planning at the district level, which shall consolidate the plans prepared by the 
panchayats and the municipalities in the district and prepare a draft 
development plan for the district as a whole. In preparing the draft 
development plan, the District Planning Committee (DPC) shall clearly spell 
out the way forward for the integrated development of infi-astructure and 
environmental conservation and the extent and type of available resources, 
whether financial or otherwise, in matter of common interest between the 
panchayats and the municipalities including spatial plaiming, sharing of water, 
and other physical and natural resources. The Act has mandated that not less 
than four-fifths of the total number of persons in DPC shall be elected by and 
from amongst the elected members of the district panchayats and the 
municipalities in each district. The remaining one-fifth of the DPC members 
are to be nominated by the state and could include MPs/MLAs as well as civil 
society experts who could assist in the planning process with their technical 
expertise. Even the selection of the chairperson has been left to the state 
legislature to decide. 
As per the information available only 18 states and 4 union territories 
have formed such committees and many of them remain on paper without 
fimctioning as an effective tool of local planning. The DPCs have not been 
constituted in the states of Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, J & K and NCT of 
Delhi.^ ° 
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Table 4.2 
State-wise Status of DPCs 
States 
Andhra Pradesh 
Arunachal Pradesh 
Assam 
Bihar 
Chhattisgarh 
Goa 
Gujarat 
Haryana 
Himachal Pradesh 
Jharkhand 
Kamatraka 
Kerala 
Madhya Pradesh 
Maharashtra 
Manipur 
Orissa 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Sikkim 
Tamil Nadu 
Tripura 
Uttar Pradesh 
Uttaranchal 
West Bengal 
A & N Islands 
Chandigarh 
Dadra & Nagar Haveli 
Damand & Diu 
Lakshdweep 
Pondicherry 
Status 1 Details of chairperson 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
-
-
ZP chairperson 
ZP chairperson 
Minister 
ZP chairperson 
-
Divisional Commissioner 
Chairperson appointed by 
Government 
-
ZP chairperson 
ZP chairperson 
Minister 
-
ZP chairperson 
Minister 
-
ZP chairperson 
ZP chairperson 
ZP chairperson 
-
-
-
ZP chairperson 
ZP chairperson 
-
ZP chairperson 
ZP chairperson 
District Collector 
-
Source : Annual Report, Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India, 2006. 
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Out of 18 states/UTs where this committee has been constituted only in 
9 States/UTs the chairpersons of the zila parishad has been made the 
chairperson of this committee. In rest of the states/UTs where these committees 
have been constituted either Minister or Bureaucrat has been made the 
chairperson of these bodies. The demerits of this system as illustrated by M.P., 
Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Maharashtra and U.P. is that since the Minister is a 
very busy person the proceedings of DPCs either gets postponed or held under 
Vice Chairperson performing the function of chairman. Elected representatives 
of the local bodies might feel that Minister or Bureaucrat is being thrust of 
them. In this context, it is pertinent to note that many working Group reports 
have recommended exclusion of MLAs and MPs from the deliberations of 
panchayats. The duty of the DPC is to forward the development plan, to the 
government of the state. It means that the authority of decision-making is not 
vested with it. This crucial issue needs to be modified and DPCs should be 
empowered to decide upon the plans prepared for the district and it may be 
submitted for information to the government. 
In a Review meeting chaired by Prime Minister, on 2"*^  June 2005, it was 
decided that the Planning Commission and the Ministry of Panchayati Raj 
would work together on preparing the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-12) 
based on District Plans in accordance with part IX and IX-A of the 
Constitution. In this connection the Ministry has set up a Task Force headed by 
Mr. V. Ramachandran, Former Deputy Chairperson of the Kerala state 
Planning Board to work out the modalities." 
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IV.4 Financing to Panchayats: A Fiscal Domain 
Fiscal domain of local government is linked with fiscal and functional 
devolution. The finances that local government are empowered to raise can 
only be justified in the context of the functions they are to perform. The three 
tier structure of local governance as introduced by 1^^ Amendment Act the 
possibility of functional assignment has enhanced. However, the present 
legislation governing functional assignment by the three tiers exhibits very 
little evidence of efforts in this dkection. The National government is also 
unequally assigned the functions of income redistribution and macro-economic 
stabihzation which involve cross regional issues and may be performed 
effectively only at that level. Significantly, powers and functions of panchayats 
in India are subject to variation across the states. The functional domain has 
been widened by the State Conformity Amendment Act. A large number of 
development activities and functions are assigned to the panchayati raj 
institutions but efforts for widening the fiscal domain of panchayats are not 
adequate and therefore, finances and functions assigned to panchayats are not 
matching. In principle, panchayats may be benefited through implying the uses 
charges and effectively exploiting the potential of tax revenue, Importantly, 
property base taxes pose a high potential to be exploited effectively by 
panchayats in India. Interestingly, lives on the use of common resources in the 
form of forest, water bodies, quarriable materials and minor minerals, levies on 
real privately owned property and on production originating areas are also 
included in the broad fiscal domain of panchayats.^ ^ 
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IV.4.1 Structure and Trends of Panchayat Revenue and Expenditure 
The finances of the panchayats consist of: (i) own sources, that is taxes 
assigned by the state panchayat acts to the local bodies concerned and levied 
and collected by them. The most important among them are: (a) land tax (non-
agricultural), (b) house/building tax, (c) vehicle tax, (d) tax on profession, trade 
and callings, (e) tax on fairs and other entertainment, (f) tax on advertisement, 
(g) octroi on animals or goods or both brought for sale, (h) lump sum levy on 
factories in lieu of taxes, (i) special tax on construction and public works, etc. 
In addition there are non-tax revenue such as fee and fines, rent from 
properties and charges levied by panchayats for the provision of public 
facilities. These mclude (a) water rate, (b) lighting fee/rate, (c) street cleaning 
fee, (d) conservancy fee, (e) drainage fee, (f) sanitary fee for public toilets, (g) 
uses charges for hospitals and schools, (h) fee on markets and weekly bazaars, 
(i) fee on animals sold, etc. (ii) The tax sharing is the second miportant 
instrument of resource mobilization at the panchayati raj institutions level. 
Land revenue is commonly shared with PRIs across the states. In addition 
stamp duty which is a tax on transfer of property. There are other two sources 
like royalties and forest revenue which are also shared with PRIs by some of 
the states, (iii) Grants from the Central/states government can be grouped under 
two categories: (a) conditional (specific purpose), (b) unconditional (general 
purpose). There are other type of grants viz, block grants, establishment grants, 
road maintenance grants, minor irrigation grants, and miscellaneous grants. The 
panchayats are also entitled for taking donations from individuals and 
institutions, religious trust and voluntary organization, private concerns.'^  
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Table 4.3 
Revenues and Expenditure of PRIs (1993-94 to 2002-03) All-Tiers 
Year 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Source; 
Total 
Revenue 
(crore) 
10665.9 
11883 
13579.2 
16178.7 
19355.5 
17295.7 
22264.1 
23244.4 
22470.1 
24010.5 
Report of E 
Total 
Expenditure 
(crore) 
11658.39 
13004.95 
14542.73 
17254.37 
20931.16 
18306.89 
21693.12 
24060.14 
23941.19 
24286.29 
levenlh and T\ 
Own Sources Percentage 
of Total Revenue 
Tax 
2.15 
2.14 
2.22 
2.13 
1.95 
3.64 
3.04 
3.24 
3.61 
3.87 
velfth Fir 
Non-
Tax 
1.84 
1.87 
1.77 
1.6 
1.55 
3.07 
2.95 
2.86 
2.77 
2.98 
lance Con 
Both 
3.99 
4.01 
3.99 
3.73 
3.5 
6.71 
5.99 
6.08 
6.38 
6.85 
umission, 
Transfer 
Percentage 
of Total 
Revenue 
96 
95.98 
96.01 
96.27 
96.5 
93.29 
94 
93.9 
93.62 
93.16 
Ministry of F 
Transfer 
Percentage 
of Total 
Expenditure 
87.83 
87.7 
89.64 
90.27 
89.24 
88.13 
96.48 
90.71 
87.87 
92.09 
mance, 
Govt, of India. 
Table 4.3 shovv's rural government generates small amounts of revenue 
from their own tax and non tax sources. The ovm source revenue (tax + non-tax 
revenue) of panchayats as a proportion of the total revenue for 1993-94 which 
was around 3.99 per cent, increased to only 6.85 per cent in 2002-03. Total tax 
revenue of PRIs increased from 2.15 in 1993-94 to 3.87 in 2002-03 in terms of 
total revenue. It increased by only 24.77 per cent during 1993-94 to 2002-03. 
On the other hand the contribution of non-tax revenue in the combined receipts 
of PRIs was 2.98 per cent which is slightly lowest than the corresponding share 
of tax revenues (3.87) in 2002-03. The analysis shows that the revenues 
mobilized by the panchayats have shown marginal increase over the years. 
Thus PRIs largely depends upon the other sources of revenue because of their 
o o o o o o o o o o o 
1993-94 
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limited taxable capacity. Grants are also given to encourage PRIs to increase 
their income and enable them to manage functions entrusted to them. The 
transfers and the other revenue (assigned, shared, grants) accounted to 96 per 
cent in 1993-94 which declined to 93.16 per cent in 2002-03 in term of total 
revenues but the proportion of other revenues of PRIs to the total expenditure 
increased from 87.83 per cent in 1993-94 to 92.09 per cent in 2002-03. 
Table 4.4 provides some basic information relating to own revenue 
receipts as percentage of total receipts in selected states during 1993-94 to 
2002-03. An analysis of annual average of own revenue to percentage of total 
revenue was recorded highest in Haryana (47.26%) followed by Punjab 
(46.24%), Kerala (22.77%), Madhya Pradesh (16.91%) and Bihar (12.34%). 
On the other hand the lowest annual average recorded in Kamataka (1.01%), 
Gujarat (2.10%), Rajasthan (2.12%), Andhra Pradesh (5.01%) and Maharashtra 
(5.48%) during the same period. 
The functional domain of the PRIs consists of a mix of activities which 
involve different quantum and types of expenditure. In terms of the statutory 
provision, PRIs are expected to perform functions which broadly be divided 
into civic functions, development functions and maintenance functions. The 
civic functions comprise, in the main provision of drinking water, drainage and 
sanitation, preventive health care, lighting of public places and road 
connectivity. Their development functions comprise primary education, 
primary health welfare, agriculture, animal husbandry etc. Maintenance 
functions include maintenance of building, and common property resources. Of 
late, the PRIs are also being involved in the implementation management of 
certain centrally sponsored schemes/programme.'"* 
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Table 4.5 pointed out that in Punjab 55.32% of expenditure was met 
from own revenue sources, followed by Madhya Pradesh 36.86%, Haryana 
20.82%, West Bengal 17.64% and Himachal Pradesh 16.11% in 2002-03. On 
the other hand the lowest share of own revenue to percentage of total 
expenditure was in Rajasthan 2.17%, Bihar 2.27%, and Gujrat 2.72% in the 
same period. The average annual growth rate of own revenue was highest in 
Punjab 44.39% of total expenditure during the period 1993-94 to 2002-03 and 
the lowest was in Kamataka (1.21%) in same period. 
The analysis of fiscal mismatch between own revenue and total 
expenditure of panchayats and also between total revenue and total 
expenditure of panchayats present very interesting picture and demonstrates 
that panchayats are facing a huge deficit and their own resources are meager to 
meet out the emerging fiscal needs and even the meeting out the committed 
liabilities. Table 4.6 shows that the fiscal mismatch between own revenue and 
total expenditure of panchayats at all tiers in 2002-03 was found more 
pronounced in the states of Andhra Pradesh (4936.93 crore), Maharashtra 
(4214.31 crore), Kamataka (4036.43 crore), Gujarat (2494.48 crore), and 
Rajasthan (1699.01 crore). An analysis of compound annual growth rate 
(CAGR) of fiscal mismatch between own revenue and total expenditure was 
recorded highest in Kerala (42.72%) followed by Himachal Pradesh (21.64%) 
and Haryana (20.78%) during 1993-94 to 2002-03. The lowest CAGR was 
recorded in Punjab (-9.95%), West Bengal (-8.00%) and Madhya Pradesh 
(-1.30%). It is interesting to note that fiscal mismatch has increased sharply in 
2002-03 as compared to the 1997-98. It shows that there is rise in the total 
expenditure of the panchayats in the post devolution period. Thus total income 
of panchayats is predominantly dominated by grants in aid and fiscal transfer 
by the centre and state governments. 
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Another measure, i.e. the ratio of revenue to NSDP also unfolds the 
degree of fiscal decentralization achieved at the sub state level. It can be seen 
from table (4.7) that in 1997-98 the ratio of total revenue of PRIs in the total 
NSDP was 1.91 percent which declmed to 1.36 percent in 2002-03. On the 
other hand the ratio of total expenditure of PRIs to the total NSDP was 2.07 per 
cent which declined to 1.37 per cent during same period. Due to increase in the 
level of own revenue of PRIs, the decline in their total revenue as a ratio to 
NSDP was marginal. This improvement in own revenue of PRIs is visible in 
ten states only. The ratio in seven states exceeded the all India level, the highest 
share was recorded in Kerala, followed by Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, 
Maharashtra, Punjab, and Haryana in 2002-03. But the share of own revenue as 
per cent of NSDP was lowest the national level in states viz. Bihar, Himachal 
Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Kamataka, Gujarat, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu in 
2002-03. 
The information on the extent of availability of resources for PRIs in 
major states has been presented in table 4.8. It can be seen from the table that 
per capita revenue of PRIs at the all states level was Rs. 296 during 1997-98 
and the same went up to Rs. 313 in the year 2002-03. The increase during five 
year period was very marginal. The state wise position reveals that in three 
states viz Kamataka, Gujarat, and Maharashtra, the per capita revenues 
exceeded Rs. 500 per annum during 1997-98. In another five states, the same 
varied between Rs.lOO and Rs. 500 the situation during 2002-03 was not 
encouraging. It may be observed from the table that out of 14 states the per 
capita revenue had increased only in nine states and in the remaining five 
states, it had actually declined in 2002-03. Compound average growth rate of 
per capita revenue was found to be high m Haryana (25.15%), Himachal 
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Pradesh (24.19%), Kerala (21.30%), Kamataka (18.31%) and Andhra Pradesh 
(1343%) but CAGR was found to be low in Bihar (-25.54%), West Bengal 
(-7.64%), Uttar Pradesh (-2.82%) and Punjab (-2.80%o) during the period 1993-
94 to 2002-03. 
Table 4.9 has pointed out an analysis of the per capita CAGR of all the 
PRls in the 14 select states shows that it ranged from Maharashtra (3.35%) to 
Kerala (32.26%) per annum during the period under review. While negative 
growth rate were in Bihar (-26.63%), West Bengal (-8.15%), Uttar Pradesh 
(.4.470/0) and Punjab (-3.26%). It may be observed from the table that out of 14 
states the per capita expenditure was more than national level only in seven 
states and in the remaining seven states it was declined in 2002-03. 
Table 4.10 reveals state-wise comparative study of Revenue position of 
PRIs in 1997-98 to 2002-03. The per capita revenue stood at Rs. 29 in West 
Bengal, Rs. 39 in Bihar, Rs. 45 in Uttar Pradesh, Rs. 111 in Madhya Pradesh in 
2002-03. But all India per capita figure was Rs. 313 in the same period. On the 
other hand the per capita NSDP in the same states stood at Rs. 18494 in West 
Bengal, Rs. 5606 in Bihar, Rs. 9963 in Uttar Pradesh, Rs. 11500 in Madhya 
Pradesh and all India per capita figure was Rs. 16552 in 2002-03. There was a 
considerably margin between per capita revenue of PRIs and per capita NSDP. 
The above analysis shows that there is a huge fiscal mismatch between 
own revenue and total expenditure at all tiers of the panchayats. It means that 
the own financial resources of the panchayats are highly inadequate to meet out 
the fiscal needs. Even though the financial devolution has been ensured to the 
local bodies, these bodies face fiscal deficit. It shows that only a few states 
have the horizon of fiscal domain and their realizing sound fiscal health. Thus, 
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there is need to reconsider the devolution criteria and transfer of resources to 
the panchayats for their fiscal needs. 
Borrowing play an important role in development fmance. In India, the 
development expenditures of both Central and state governments are largely 
met from borrowed funds. Many state governments intended to provide this 
facility to their panchayats. In this direction, the states in their panchayati raj 
acts have made a provision for borrowings by the panchayats. However, there 
was no evidence of any panchayat make use of this statutory power. The main 
reason for this was stiff conditions laid down for raising loans. ^ ^ 
IV.4.2 Role of State Finance Commission 
Setting up of SFCs for a period of five years is one of the mandated 
requirements of the constitutional provisions. In terms of articles 243 (I) and 
243 (Y) of the Constitution, the SFCs are to recommend (a) the principles that 
should govern the distribution between the state on the one hand and the local 
bodies on the other of the net proceeds of taxes etc. leviable by the state and the 
inter-se allocation between different panchayats and municipalities; (b) the 
determination of the taxes, duties, tolls and fees which may be assigned to, or 
appropriated by the local bodies; and (c) grants-in-aid from the consolidated 
fund of the state to the local bodies. The SFCs are also required to suggest 
measures needed to improve the financial position of the panchayats and the 
municipalities (TFC Repot 2004). Out of twenty eight states, nineteen 
appointed the second SFC, of which ten had submitted their reports. Of these, 
only six have been laid before the state legislature along with action taken 
report. A third round of SFCs have been constituted only in few states viz, 
Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Madhya 
Pradesh.^ ^ 
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A close examination of some of the State Finance Commission reports 
show that these finance commissions have tried to rationalize the local tax 
structure by suggesting reforms in assessment and administration of taxes 
besides giving powers to local bodies. Finance Commissions of Kerala, 
Kamataka, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh, for example, have recommended 
reform in property taxes and have suggested the 'area based' or 'site valuation' 
system for assessment of property tax. A majority of State Finance 
Commissions also recommended autonomy to local bodies, particularly village 
panchayats for fixing tax rates and user charges. The West Bengal State 
Finance Commission has recommended a new regime of tax collection in 
which tax administration works in close cooperation with panchayats and gives 
a proportion of tax collection as entitlement to these bodies. The Rajasthan 
State Finance Commission also suggested interesting taxes, which could be 
levied by the village panchayats of the state. But all these recommendation 
given on panchayat's finance fi-om time to time by the State Finance 
Commissions are not mandatory. The poor states with dwindling financial base 
have not followed many of the guidelmes of the State Finance Commissions, 
either by choice or by compulsion.'^  
With action report, only four states - Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, 
Rajasthan and West Bengal have largely accepted the recommendations of their 
State Finance Commissions. Uttar Pradesh is the first state, which has 
committed non-discretionary transfer of funds to panchayats based on the 
recommendations of the State Finance Commission. State Finance 
Commissions in almost all the states have submitted their report to their 
respective states; however, three states - Assam, Goa and Gujarat have not 
taken any action on the reports. Kerala demonstrated considerable political will 
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by devolving approximately 40 per cent of the state's plan allocation to the 
local bodies, 70 per cent of which will go to gram panchayats.'^ 
Besides making recommendations on revenue sharing the SFCs also 
suggested grant-in-aid in the form of establishment grant, start up grant and 
other special grants. Such grants are badly needed by the PRIs, since most of 
the PRIs are starved of unified grants to take up their functions. The main 
concern with regard to SFCs has been that their recommendations were 
extremely short of the projected requirements of the PRIs. Though SFCs 
suggested tax generation by the PRIs, no structures or supportive systems were 
suggested. Most state governments had causal attitude towards the 
recommendations of the State Finance Commissions. Naturally, they did not 
indulge in transferring more buoyant and elastic issue of tax generation to PRIs 
and did not build any supportive structures to collect taxes.'^ 
IV.4.3 Central Finance Commission 
Articles 280(bb) and 280(c) of the Constitution place additional 
responsibility on the Central Finance Commission (CFC) to augment the 
consolidated fund of a state to supplement the resources of the panchayats and 
municipalities in the state on the basis of the recommendations made by the 
Finance Commission of the state. The Eleventh Finance Commission was the 
first National Finance Commission whose ToR included making 
recommendations for the transfer of additional resources relating to the local 
bodies. Due to data inadequacies and imperfections, the EFC has, again on an 
ad hoc basis, allocated a total grant of Rs, 10,000 crore for the local bodies, Rs. 
8,000 crore for the panchayats; and the balance of Rs. 2,000 crore for the urban 
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local bodies for the five year period commencing in 2000-01. The reason of 
this division was that the urban local bodies had a greater access to tax and 
non- tax resources on their own and, therefore, it is the Panchayati Raj 
Institutions (PRIs) which require substantial support. The TFC have also 
recommended accordingly that the grants-in-aid may be divided between the 
panchayats and the municipalities in ratio of 80:20. The amounts of Rs. 20,000 
crore for the PRIs and Rs.5000 crore for the municipalities. This substantial 
increase will go a long way in improving the standards of civic services 
performed by the local governments. This is equivalent to 1.24 per cent of the 
sharable tax revenues and 0.9 per cent of gross revenue receipts of the centre as 
estimated by the TFC for the period 2005-10.^ ° 
The EFC have made specific provisions for improving account keeping 
in panchayats, developing a data base, and on maintenance of civic services. In 
the absence of credible costing data, the TFC refi'ained from making specific 
allocation for individual items of expenditure and leave it to the states to assess 
the requirement of each local body and ear-mark funds accordingly out of the 
total recommended allocation. The inclusion of a decentralization index by 
EFC for inter-state distribution of the fund provision for local bodies is claimed 
as providing for the first time an incentive to decentralize. It adopted the 
criteria of the Eleventh Finance Commission for inter-se distribution with two 
important modifications. 
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Table 4.11 
Criterion and Weights nsed by E¥C and TFC Reports for Inter-Se Distribution 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
(a) 
(b) 
6. 
Criteria 
Population 
Geographical areas 
Distance from highest per capita 
Index of decentralization 
Revenue effort of which 
With respect to state own revenues 
With respect to GSDP 
Index of deprivation 
Weight (percent) 
EEC 
40 
10 
20 
20 
10 
5 
5 
-
TFC 
40 
10 
20 
-
20 
10 
10 
10 
Source : EFC and TFC Report, Ministry of Finance, Government of India. 
Considering that almost all states have by now taken effective steps for 
the implementation of the 73rd and 74* amendments and have enacted 
legislations, held elections, constituted SFCs and taken action on their reports, 
the TFC have dropped this criterion. In place of decentralization index TFC 
have included deprivation index to take into account intra-state disparities. 
Drinking water and sanitation are the two core services performed by the local 
bodies. State-wise census 2001 data have been used regarding the number of 
households fetching water from a distance, households with no latrines within 
the house premises and households with no drainage facilities for flow of waste 
water. These have been used to construct deprivation index. The other element 
in the devolution provision is the weight of 20 per cent for revenue effort of 
local bodies. It has been argued by the TFC, that the significance of the ratio of 
own resources of local bodies to states own revenues is that it also serves as a 
proxy of revenue decentralization. '^ 
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The use of population even within the index of deprivation and revenue 
effort components, in addition to the separate weight of 40 per cent for 
population in the overall formula, clearly gives population size a far larger 
weight than what is apparent in formula. Even the income distance proportion 
has been weighted by the population. As a resuh of this overemphasis on 
population, the share of six most popular states in allocation for PRIs, is well 
above 50 per cent. Since there is enormous variation between states in the 
population coverage per panchayat, this in effect penalizes states with a smaller 
coverage of population per panchayat by giving them less funding. 
The TFC report does address the issue of the fiscal domain of local 
bodies and makes a number of suggestions such as augmentation of land 
revenue, exploitation of non-revenue sources, user charges and a minimum 
revenue collection from the panchayat, are entirely in line with theory and 
practice in respect of the fiscal domain of local bodies. Some recommendations 
such as powers to PRIs to levy a tax/surcharge/cess on agricultural holdings, do 
not reflect any systematic exploration of whether revenue increase call for rate 
increase or base expansion.^ ^ 
IV.4.4 Role of Centrally Sponsored Schemes 
There is a plethora of Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSSs) being 
implemented by different Ministries and Department of Central Government. 
As per the Constitutional Mandate, in respect of 29 items of the XI Schedule, 
funds have to be devolved to the PRIs for planning and implementation of 
schemes pertaining to the particular sector. At present, there are more than 200 
CSSs, involving about Rs. 80000 crore per annum, given either as grants, loans 
or other contribution by the centre to the states for implementing programmes 
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that are considered by the Government of India to be of national/regional 
importance. 
Panchayats play an important role in implementation of the centrally 
sponsored programmes. Many programmes directly go to the PRIs viz. 
Sampooma Grameen Rozgar Yojana (SGRY), Indira Av a^s Yojana, National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak 
Yojana, Central Rural Sanitation Programme, Accelerated Rural Water Supply 
Programmes, Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyatikaran Yojana. The objectives of 
these programmes are to provide additional employment in rural area, social 
and economic infrastructure such as roads, electricity, water supply, housing 
and sanitation in rural areas ,^ ^ 
The Expert Group felt that along with these flagship progarmmes, a few 
more central programmes could be considered as important from the point of 
view of giving a clear and precise role to panchayats in plarming and 
implementation. These also include relevant progarmme under "Bharat 
Nirman", aimed at rapid improvement of rural infrastructure. Thus the share of 
CSSs in the plan budget of central ministries has increased to 70 per cent as 
against 30 per cent in the early SOs.^ "* 
However, it is also evident that the programmes of the Ministry of 
Rural Development are designed to have some involvement of the PRIs in the 
implementation and monitoring of their programmes. But CSS implemented by 
other Central Ministries, often ignore the involvement of PRIs. In case the role 
is identified, it is either non-existent or minimal.^ ^ 
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IV.5 Functionaries 
Along with the transfer of functions and funds comes the issue of 
administering them. If panchayats are to fulfill their role as agents of 
development, they need the ability to participate in the process as 
administrative functionaries. Across India, panchayats have limited powers to 
hire staff so they depend on state government to depute functionaries from line 
departments. However, the mere devolution of fiinctionaries is not sufficient 
because PRIs do not have any administrative powers over them (this holds true 
even in Kerala and Kamataka, where functionaries have been devolved in line 
with funds functions ). Deputed staff members are accoimtable only to the state 
government, which retains the power to hire, fire and compensate. 
Consequently, PRIs are given functions but have little or no effective control 
over the people expected to carry them out. Naturally, because the state 
functionaries careers and compensation are linked to state services, they are 
much more concerned with that than with responding to local governments. 
Thus training and capacity building of PRIs functionaries is essential 
and devolution of financial resources must be accompanied by suitable 
strengthening of PRIs through transfer of departmental functionaries. 
IV.6 Reforming Rural Fiscal Decentralization in India 
Unfortimately, decentralization to rural local governments, as it has 
been calibrated in India has not had the desired effect of improving the 
standards of public services for a variety of reasons. The preceding analysis 
brings out the shortcomings in policies, processes and institutions. The analysis 
underlines weaknesses in both design and implementation. First, as mentioned 
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earlier, there were inherent problems with the design of decentralization. 
Devolving functions segmented into various schemes and prioritizing them has 
meant that the rural local bodies do not take any decisions, but simply 
implement the schemes designed by the State/Central governments. Second, 
rural local governments do not have the incentive to raise revenues. 
Overwhelming proportion of the transfers is scheme based and the 
preoccupation is with implementing them - particularly those involving 
contractors. There are serious problems of design and implementation of the 
tax systems and in any case, the rural local governments' perspective is that 
they are meant to merely implement the schemes transferred to them by higher 
level goverrmients and not take any fresh initiatives. Besides, raising revenues 
in a local area with skewed power structure has not been easy and it is not 
surprising that not only the property taxes are low, but even that is not collected 
properly. As the state governments themselves faced increasingly constrained 
fiscal environment due to large additional liability arising from increase in the 
pay scales on the one hand, and a steady decline in central tax devolution on 
the other hand, the standards of services have actually declined. Thus, while the 
schemes were transferred, commensurate fimds to implement these schemes 
were not provided for and this has only caused the standards of services to 
decline. 
To enable fiscal decentralization can play an important role in 
providing public services at local level a number of reforms at the local 
government level should be carried out. These include (i) clear activity 
mapping based on comparative advantage in implementing expenditures and 
devolution of functions to the panchayats based thereon; (ii) providing 
appropriate revenue handles to local bodies; (iii) guiding the local governments 
to undertake reforms in their tax systems, particularly taxes on land and 
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property; (iv) capacity building of local governments to enable them to raise 
resources and provide public services efficiently; (v) unbundling the state 
sector schemes and consolidating the central sector schemes to enable greater 
flexibility and autonomy to panchayats in the implementation; (vi) 
Professionalisation of SFCs and reforms in the state transfers to make them 
adequate, rule based, equitable and incentive compatible; (vii) all these are 
possible only when there is an up to date information system comprising of 
fiscal, demographic, geographical and economic data for the village, block and 
district panchayat jurisdictions. 
Some of the suggested reform measures are explained in greater 
detail. Indeed, given the vast diversity and differences in the capacity it would 
be misleading to suggest one design of local government system to all states. 
Each state should evolve the taking into account the salient features of the state 
and capacity of local institutions to design and implement fiscal decisions. 
Finally the success of decentralized programme implementation depends 
on effective transfer of functions, functionaries and finances to local self 
governments. This has not happened to the necessary extent. Functions have 
not always been fully transferred. Even where the functions have been 
transferred, functionaries and fmances have remained under the control of 
higher level of government. Fiscal decentralization, in terms of resources 
mobilization and strengthening the revenue-expenditure link remains weak. 
Any serious attempt to improve the fiscal autonomy of the panchayats should 
ensure greater tax powers are assigned to the panchayats that they would be 
able to improve the standards of public services, ensure greater efficiency and 
accountability of the provision as there would be greater correspondence 
between tax payments and benefits from public services. 
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CHAPTER-V 
PANCHAYATS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
V.l Introduction 
Rural development which is concerned with economic growth and social 
justice, improvement in the living standard of the rural people by providmg 
adequate and quality social services and minimum basic needs becomes 
essential. It is a comprehensive and multi-dimensional concept, and 
encompasses the development of agriculture and allied activities, village and 
cottage industries and crafts, socio-economic infrastructure, community service 
and facilities and above all, human resources in rural areas. ^  
Decentralization is linked to rural development in many ways. The 
proximity of policy implementers to the target groups reduces information and 
transaction cost of identifymg the poor and help in designing potentially 
successful 'capacity improving' and 'safety net policies'. Decentralized 
provision of the public services can also help to link revenue-expenditure 
decisions at the margin. This can improve both efficiency and accountability in 
the provision of such services. It is also important to note that effective 
implementation of poverty-alleviation policies depends upon the 
responsiveness and capacity of local goverrmient mstitutions. Governments that 
are 'closer to the people' should in principle, be able to provide services more 
efficiently and effectively than a remote, centralized authority.^  While 
decentralization has become a development strategy of many developing 
countries, its linkage to poverty reduction in particular has been the subject of 
recent time. In India, where social and rural sector are still backward, even high 
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growth rates and innumerable poverty eradication schemes of the union as well 
as state governments have failed to ensure distributive justice and left millions 
in sustained deprivation. 
In India, about 70 percent of its population still lives in rural areas. Most 
of the people living in rural areas draw their livelihood from agricultural and 
allied sectors (60 % of the total work force), and poverty persists 28.3 percent 
(61"^  NSS Round) in 2004-05. ^ Thus economic growth with social justice 
became the proclaimed objective of the planning process under rural 
development. It began with an emphasis on agricultural production and 
consequently expanding to promote productive employment opportunities for 
rural masses, especially the poor, by integrating production, infrastructure, 
human resource and institutional development measures. . Accordingly, from 
the very beginning, our planned strategy emphasized on rural development and 
shall continue to do so in fixture. Strategically the focus of our plaiming was to 
improve the economic and social conditions of under-privileged sections of 
rural society. Strategic changes made in the Ninth Plan to promote the process 
of nation building were through decentralized planning. 
Strategic changes made in the Ninth Plan (1997-2002) to promote the 
process of nation building were through decentralized plaiming. 
Decentralisation process, which began in the 90's, aimed at removing prevalent 
anomalies from the government delivery system. With the passage of 73"^ ^ 
Amendment Act, in 1992, people's participation in the process of planning, 
decision-making, implementation and delivery system in rural India has been 
recognized. This emphasized strengthening of the panchayati raj and civil 
society groups for promoting transparency, accountability and responsibility in 
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the development process. Article 243(G) of the constitutional amendment 
which calls on state governments to devolve powers, authority and 
responsibilities to rural local bodies so as to enable them to functions as 
institutions of self government meant for providing basic infrastructure 
facilities such as roads, housing, electricity, water supply and sanitation and 
initiate the development process at the grass-roots level of rural areas, where 
the soul of India lives.'* The panchayats are mamly entrusted with the 
implementation of different Centrally Sponsored public works programmes 
such as NREGS, RGGVY, PMGSY, lAY, TSC, NRHM, CRSP, ARWSP, SSA 
and Mid-Day Meal etc administered by the various Ministries of Government 
of India. Thus decentralization of the decision-making process, means that 
panchayats are in better position to identify local preference and priorities for 
infrastructure services. Panchayati raj institutions could be a promising 
institutional link to combat poverty in terms of efficient designing and effective 
targeting. With the increasing importance of the panchayats, there is need to 
utilize their services for rural development.^  Their dependence on the 
government grant is almost total in fact, they merely act as agencies of the 
government and implement schemes according to government directives. It has 
so far not resulted in any substantial mobilization of resources locally. 
Involvement of local people can enhance accountability and quality 
implementation; but local performance depends on the institutional and 
political environments in which the decentralization process works.^  Although 
73 Amendment was not a component of structural reform but the attempt to 
decentralize allocative decisions with the change in development strategy 
should be more open and market friendly economic regime. 
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V.2 Rural Infrastructure Development 
Economic growth and human development are strongly determined by 
the prevailing infrastructure development scenario. The development of rural 
infrastructure is crucial for growth of rural economy as well as welfare. It is not 
only a key component of rural development but also an important ingredient in 
ensuring success of any sustainable poverty reduction programme. Rural 
infrastructure promotes better productivity, increased agricultural incomes, 
adequate employment, etc. Efforts have been made to bring about rapid and 
sustainable development and socio-economic transformation in rural India with 
an integrated approach towards improving the quality of life of rural poor and 
ensuring equity and effective people's participation,^ The trust of rural 
development programmes has been to make a frontal attack on poverty through 
employment generation programmes, productive assets transfer through 
institutional credit and subsidy programmes and programmes of rural housing, 
roads, drinking water, and sanitation. Strong thrust has been given to social 
security programmes for providing assistance to the destitute and poor families. 
Assistance and encouragement to voluntary agencies and training of 
fiinctionaries of rural development forms part of the emphasis on accelerated 
rural development. • 
Any strategy for rural development must involve the people themselves 
and their institutions at all levels. The need for revitalizing panchayati raj 
institutions has, therefore, been recognized as an instrument for participative 
planning and implementation of various development programmes at grass-root 
level. The government is constantly endeavouring to empower the panchayati 
raj institutions in terms of functions, power and finance.^ 
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V.2.1 Rural Roads 
Rural roads connectivity is a key component of rural development, since 
it promotes access to economic and social services, thereby generating 
increased agricultural productivity, non-agriculture employment as well as non-
agricultural productivity, which in turn expands rural growth opportunities and 
rural income through which poverty can be reduced.^  Keeping in view the 
crucial role of rural roads in the all round growth of the rural economy a 
number of measures have been taken by the government of India to facilitate 
the rapid growth of rural roads. However, the construction of village roads was 
included under the Minimum Needs Programme (MNP) for the first time in the 
5"^  Five Year Plan (1974-79), which envisaged providing connectivity to 
population groups of 1500 persons or more with all weather roads. Further, the 
government of India initiated a number of programmes such as the National 
Rural Employment Programme (NREP), the Rural Landless Employment 
Guarantee Programme (RLEGP), the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY), the 
Innovative Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (IJRY), the Basic Minimum Services 
(BMS), the Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS) and other similar schemes 
under which rural roads were constructed year after year and plan after plan. 
Furthermore, the issue of regional imbalances in rural connectivity were not 
specifically addressed in these plans and programmes. Despite the nation-wide 
network of all weather roads in rural India about 40 per cent of Indian 
habitations remained unconnected as on April 1, 2000. Government of India set 
up the National Rural Road Development Committee in the year 2000 to 
recommend various measures to provide all weather rural connectivity to all 
the villages in the country.'° 
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V.2.1.1 Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana 
On the recommendations of the-Committee, Government of India has 
launched a nation-wide programme called Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana 
(PMGSY) on 25^ December 2000. The total requirement of fiinds was 
estimated at Rs. 60,000 crores. However, according to latest figures made 
available by the state governments under a survey to identify Core Network as 
part of the PMGSY programme, about 1.72 lakh unconnected habitations need 
to be taken up under the PMGSY. Based on the core Network survey 
conducted after launching the programme and the experience of the first 3 
years with the average cost of construction of PMGSY roads, the cost of the 
programme has been revised to Rs. 1,32,000 crore. 
V.2.1.2 Bharat Nirman 
The Finance Minister, in his Budget Speech on 28 February, 2005, 
identified Rural Raods as one of the six components of Bharat Nirman and set a 
goal to provide connectivity to all villages with a population of 1000 (500 in 
the case of hilly or tribal areas) with an All-weather road by this year, ie 2009. 
A total of 66,802 habitations are proposed to be provided new connectivity 
under Bharat Nirman. This would involve construction of 1,46,185 Kms of 
rural roads. In addition to new connectivity, Bharat Nirman envisages 
upgradation/renewal of 1,94,130 Kms of existing rural roads. This comprises 
60% upgradation and 40% renewal of surface coat. The requirement of funds 
for Bharat Nirman is estimated at Rs. 48,000 crore." However the availability 
of fund would be as under: 
• Cess on Diesel Rs. 16000 crore 
• Assistance from ADB/WB Rs. 9000 crore 
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Assistance from NABARD 
Budgetary support 
Rs. 16500 crore 
Rs. 6500 crore 
V.2.1.3 Role of Panchayats 
Elected and official members of the panchayats would be trained to 
undertake social audit of road construction. They also need to be trained in the 
benchmarks relating to road maintenance as this is to be handled by the 
panchayats after the five year period of maintenance by the contractor. A time 
bound action plan activity mappmg and transfer of rural roads is required to 
assign maintenance of rural roads to the panchayats 
V.2.1.4 Financial Outlay and Expenditure: 
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Table 5.1 
Year-Wise Allocation of Funds and Expenditure Incurred Under PMGSY 
Year 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Amount Allocated 
(Rs. crore) 
2500 
2500 
2500 
2325 
2148.00+320.00* 
3809.50+410.50* 
3725.62+1500* 
3900.00+2600.00* 
+ 4500.00** 
Amount Released 
(Rs. crore) 
2435.00 
2496.88 
2472.13 
2314.33 
2436.64 
4190.59 
4519.34 
10,412.63 
-r-r-. = TTTA^ : 
Expenditure Incurred 
(Rs. Crore) 
6582.12 
3025.26 
4100.39 
4560.00 
10,104.80 
Source : Annual Report, 2007-08, Ministry of Rural Development, GOI. 
The central allocation under PMGSY was 2500 crore in 2000-01 has 
increased to 11000 crore in 2007-08. Out of which Rs. 4500 crore have been 
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drawn from RIDF window of NABARD during 2007-08. Since inception of the 
scheme, the Ministry has released Rs. 29123.01 crores upto November 2007. 
The utilization of funds reported by the state/UTs is Rs, 26277.80 crore which 
is 90.23 per cent of the total funds released. 
V.2.1.5 Targets and Achievements 
Prior to 2005-2006, no specific physical targets were laid down. From 
the year 2005-06, outcome Budget laid down target in terms of numbers of 
habitations connected and road length (in kms) completed. PMGSY targets 
fixed for the year 2007-08 are higher as compared to the previous year. Year-
wise targets and achievement are given below. 
Table 5.2 
Year-Wise Physical Performance of PMGSY 
Period 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
2008-09 
Total 
Habitations covered 
(nos.) 
Target 
7034 
16130 
20071 
18100 
61335 
Achievement 
5252 
8279 
7040 
1948 
22519 
New connections (km.) 
Target 
15492.40 
35182.15 
43989.93 
35220.00 
129884.48 
Achievement 
18053.70 
21422.85 
21901.76 
6122.03 
67500:34 
Upgradation (km.) 
Target 
11394.40 
54669.26 
59316.28 
52720.00 
178099.94 
Achievement 
3925.60 
46129.90 
35470.87 
10553.64 
96080.01 
Source : Ministry of Rural Development, http://Bharatnirman.gov.in 
Upto August 2008, 22519 habitations have been connected by 
constructing 67500 km rural roads and projects for connecting 21973 
habitations are in progress. In addition 96080 km of existing rural roads have 
been upgraded/renewed under the programme. 
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V.2.1.6 Policy Initiatives and Restructuring of PMGSY: 
• For mobilizing financial resources for PMGSY, a separate RIDF window 
under NABARD has been opened for funding PMGSY roads. To make 
the enabling provision for drawal and repayment of funds out of Cess 
money, the Central Road Fund Act, 2000 has been amended. 
• Standard Bidding Document has been amended and package sizes from 
Rs. 50 lakh - Rs. 2 crore and Rs. 2 crore - Rs. 10 crore allowed with 
differential qualification criteria to enable more contractors to participate. 
Flexibility has been given to States to float packages of more than Rs. 10 
crore for facilitating participation of large construction agencies in 
execution of projects. 
Joint ventures between big and small contractors permitted. 
Performance incentive for timely completion introduced in September 
2006 through higher weightage in qualification assessment in future 
contracts. 
• 
• 
• The contractmg and execution is brought to a high standard through a 3-
tier monitoring system that enables measurement of quality at site. A 
detailed Quality Assurance Hand-book containing details of quality 
control arrangements and test procedures has been circulated among the 
implementing agencies. 
Special relaxation was made for the blocks bordering international 
boundary in the hill States (as identified by the Ministry of Home Affairs), 
that all habitations within a path distance of 10 km may be treated as a 
cluster for consideration under PMGSY. This cluster approach would 
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enable provision of connectivity to a larger number of habitations, 
particularly in the hill/mountainous areas. 
• For ensuring high level of quality in road works, three tier quality control 
arrangements have been put in position. Transparency through Citizen 
information Board is being ensured. People's participation including the 
participation of the public representatives have been ensured through joint 
inspection of works. Online Management Monitoring and Accounting 
System (OMMAS) have been made functional. 
• Pilot proj ect on use of Jute Geotextile started. 
• Pilot projects on CC roads, use of fly-ash, modified bitumen, soil 
stabilization being undertaken.'^  
V.2.2 Rural Housing 
Shelter and development are complimentary and supplementary to each 
other. Provision of shelter has been one of the critical components of the 
government's strategy for employment generation and poverty alleviation in 
rural areas since the beginning of the planning era in the country. Accordingly, 
the Government of India announced a "national Housing and Habitat Policy" in 
the year 1998 which aimed at providing Housing for All' and facilitating the 
construction of 20 lakh additional housing unit (13 lakh in rural areas and 7 
lakh in urban areas) annually, with emphasis on extending benefits to the poor 
and the deprived. An action plan had also been prepared. But the action plan 
more or less remained on paper. The action plan had the following components 
(i) conversion of unserviceable kutcha houses in Indira Awas Yojana, (ii) 
Pradhan Mantri Gramodaya Yojana - Gramin Awaas, (iii) credit-cum-subsidy 
scheme for rural Housing, (iv) Samagra Awaas Yjana (v) Innovative stream for 
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Rural Housing and Habitat Development, (vi) Rural Building Centres, (vii) 
Enhancement of equity contribution by the Ministry of Rural Development to 
HUDCO (viii) National Mission for Rural Housing and Habitat. If we critically 
assess an evaluate these programme we can see that no visible or tangible 
impact has been made in solving the rural housing problem.^ '* 
As per Census 2001, the housing shortage in the rural areas was about 149 
lakhs units as compared to 137 Ikahunit as per the 1991 census. To add to this 
short fall, 10 lakh additional requirement are generated each year. Further the 
shortage of housing is expected to increase up to 80 million houses by the end 
of the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-2012), with more than 70 per cent among 
the economically weaker section and low income group segment, entailing an 
investment of Rs. 1,048,000 crore.'^  Even 'Bharat Nirman' has a provision for 
construction of only 15 lakh rural houses each year. It will take not less than 30 
years (the year 2030) to provide houses for all the rural poor given other factors 
remain in the same.^ ^ 
V.2.2.1 Indira Awaas Yojana 
The Government of India is implementing Indira Awaas Yojana (LAY) 
since the year 1985-86 to provide financial assistance for construction / up-
gradation of dwelling units to the below poverty line (BPL) rural households 
belonging to the scheduled castes, scheduled Tribes and freed bonded labourers 
categories. Under the scheme, financial resources are shared between the centre 
and the states on a 75:25 basis. Since, reduction of shelterlessness is the 
primary objective, 75% weightage is given to housing shortage and 25% to the 
poverty ratios prescribed by Planning Commission for state level allocation. 
For district level allocation, 75% weightage is given again to housing stprtage 
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and 25% to SC/ST population of the concerned districts. The ceiling on 
construction assistance under the lAY has been enhanced w.e.f. 1.4.2008, Rs. 
25, 000/- to Rs. 35,000/- per unit in the plain areas and from Rs. 27,500/ - to 
Rs. 38,500/- in hilly/difficult areas. For up-gradation of kutcha house, the 
financial assistance has also been enhanced from Rs. 12,500/- to Rs. 15,000/-
per unit. 
On the basis of allocations made and targets fixed, district Rural 
development Agency (DRDAs)/Zilla Parishad (ZPs) decide Panchayat-wise 
number of houses to be constructed under lAY and intimate the same to the 
concerned Gram Panchayat. Thereafter, the Gram Sabha selects the 
beneficiaries, restricting its number to the target allotted, from the list of 
eligible households from the Permanent LAY Waitlists. No fijrther approval of 
the higher authority is required. The Sanitary latrine and smokeless chullah and 
proper drainage are required for each lAY house. Latrine could be constructed 
separate for the lAY house on the site of beneficiary.The construction of the 
houses is the sole responsibility of the beneficiary. Engagement of contractors 
is strictly prohibited. There is provision of free electricity coimection to be 
provided to LAY houses under Rajiv Gandhi Gram Vidutikaran Yojana. '^ 
V.2.2.2 Physical and Financial Performance 
From 2002-03, central allocation under the lAY and credit-cum-subsidy 
scheme have been combined. Up to 20% of the allocation available under lAY 
can now be utilized for upgradation or credit-cum-subsidy or both. 
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Table 5.3 
Year-Wise Physical and Financial Performance of lAY 
Year 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-2000 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Allocation 
(crore) 
1440.85 
1854.62 
2132.35 
2150.60 
2156.25 
2207.42 
2492.75 
3279.24 
3641.33 
3874.72 
5374.18 
Releases 
1395.98 
1847.19 
1917.61 
2028.66 
2492.11 
2170.98 
2494.14 
3842.51 
3650.77 
3876.51 
3946.22 
Utilization 
1591.47 
1803.88 
1907.63 
2185.80 
2149.55 
2794.96 
2580.09 
3262.08 
3654.09 
4253.42 
3223.14 
Targetted 
Houses (lakh) 
7.18 
9.87 
12.72 
12.44 
12.94 
13.14 
14,85 
15,62 
14.41 
15.33 
21.27 
Constructed/ 
Upgraded 
Houses (lakh) 
7.70 
8.36 
9.26 
11.70 
11.71 
15.49 
13.61 
15.21 
15.52 
14.98 
10.92 
Source : Annual Report, 2007-08, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of 
India 
The allocation under lAY for rural housing was 1440.85 crore in 1997-98 
for the construction of 7.70 lakh houses have increased to 5374.18 crore in 
2007-08 for construction of 10.92 lakh houses. In 2007-08, Rs. 2958.67 crore 
were released as central assistance under the Indira Awaas Yojana to various 
states and Union Territories, but it was only Rs, 1117.11 crore in 1997-98. 
Again for 2008-09, adequate budget provision has been made by the plaiming 
Commission for coverage of more than 20 lakh houses. 
About 181.51 lakh houses have been constructed under lAY since 
inception of the scheme with an expenditure of Rs. 36900.41 crore upto 31 
May, 2008. 
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V.2.2.3 Bharat Nirman 
Rural housing is one of ttie six components of Bharat Nirman. Under 
Bharat Nirman, 60 lakh houses were to be constructed under the scheme of 
Indira Awaas Yojana in four years w.e.f 2005-06 to 2008-09. 60.12 lakh 
houses have been constructed under Bharat Nirman Programme period and thus 
the target has already been exceeded.^ * 
V.2.2.4 Policy initiative and restructuring of lAY: 
• Up to 20% of allocation to the district can be used for conversion of 
unserviceable kutcha houses for upgradation/pucca houses, subject to 
ceiling of assistance of Rs. 15,000 per unit. 
• Allocation for exigencies in housing increased from Rs. 50 lakh to 10% of 
lAY allocation at the district level or Rs. 50 lakh, whichever is higher, to 
meet the exigencies arising out of natural calamities and emergency 
situation (Feb. 2007). 
• For ensuring transparency in selection of the beneficiaries, system of 
"Permanent LAY Waitlist" have been operationalised. These lists are to be 
painted on the walls of Gram Sabha, Panchayats, Schools and printed and 
placed in the web site for full transparency in selection/allocation of 
houses etc. 
• 15% of fiinds and physical target have been reserved for the minority 
community (Oct. 2006). 
• Assistance for construction of smokeless chulhas and latrines in lAY 
houses can be availed out of Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC) funds in 
addition to the financial assistance under lAY. 
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• A provision in the current year budget has been made for financial 
assistance for providing land for house sites to the rural BPL house site 
less families. 
• The Government approved the change in funding pattern for the schemes 
of lAY from the existing pattern of 75:25 being shared between Central 
and States to 90:10 for the North Eastern States including Sikkim. This 
decision of the Govt, has been implemented from the current year and will 
be applicable to the fiinds released on 2"'' instalments. 
• A National Rural Housing & Habitat Policy is being framed. The goal of 
the draft policy is to ensure adequate and affordable housing for all, to 
facilitate development of sustainable and inclusive habitats by expanding 
government support, promoting community participation, and public-
private partnership within the framework of panchayati Raj.'^ 
V.2.3 Rural Drinking Water Supply 
Availability of potable water in rural areas is strongly interlinked with 
rural development and growth and displays direct, positive results for human 
health and well-being, especially for women and children. It is the most 
precious and indispensable resource and fimdamental to the survival of human 
being, livestock and plants. India has 4 per cent of world's water availability 
and 16 per cent of the world's population to sustain. Of the limited water 
resources available for human consumption, 70 per cent is not potable.^" 
As per census of India, 2001, the coverage of households having access to 
safe drinking water was 77.9 per cent comprising 90 per cent of urban 
households and around 73 per cent of rural households. There are still many 
village in the country without safe drinking water facility. In mountainous and 
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sub-mountainous areas and in desert and water scarcity rural areas, women and 
even adult girls travel a long distance to fetch drinking water. This causes a lot 
of damage to the health of women in general and pregnant women in particular. 
Ironically, it affects largely the education of girl child in general and those 
belonging to impoverished families in particular, largely changing girl children 
in the collection of water from distant source. Besides the lack of access to safe 
drinking water, some areas of the country are affected by excessive salinity, 
fluoride, and nitrate arsenic in ground water making it unfit for human 
consumption.^ ^ Annually, 37.7 million people are affected by water borne 
disease, 1.5 million children are estimated to die to diarrhoea and 62 million 
people are at the risk of suffering from fluorosis due to excessive fluoride in 
ground water.^ ^ 
To achieve the objective of providing safe drinking water in all rural 
habitations, programmes like the Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme 
(ARWSP), The Pradhan Mantri Gramodaya Yoj ana-Rural Drinking Water are 
being implemented. The ARWSP currently implemented through the Rajiv 
Gandhi National Drinking Water mission by the Department of Drinking Water 
Supply. 
V.2.3.1 Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP) 
A national water supply programme was introduced in the social sector in 
1954. The Government of India provided assistance to the states establishing 
special investigation divisions in the Fourth Five year Plan to carry out 
identification of drinking problem of villages. Taking into account the 
magnitude of the problem, and accelerate the pace of coverage of problem 
villages, the Central Government has introduced the ARWSP in 1972-73 to 
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assist the states and Union Territories witii 100 per cent grant-in-aid to 
implement drinking water supply schemes in such villages. The entire 
programme called the National Drinking Water Mission (NDWM) was 
introduced as one of the five Missions in the social sector in 1986. NDWM was 
renamed as Rajiv Gandhi National Drinking Water Mission(RGNDWM) in 
1991 and Department of Drinking Water Supply was created in year 1999. 
V.2.3.2 Objectives: 
• To ensure coverage of all rural habitations with access to safe drinking 
water; 
• To ensure drinking water quality affected habitations, 
• To institutionalize the reforms initiatives in the rural drinking water 
supply sector. 
V.2.3.3 Norms for coverage: 
• 40 litres per capita per day (LPCD) of drinking water for human beings; 
• 30 LPCD of additional water for cattle in areas under the Desert 
Development Programme (DDP); 
• One hand pump or stand post for every 250 persons; 
• Availability of water source within 1.6 km in plains and 100 litres 
elevation in hilly areas. 
V.2.3.4 Funding Pattern: 
• Under ARWSP, funds are provided to states for making provision of safe 
drinking water in rural habitations. 15 per cent of these funds can be spent 
on 0 & M of the existing drinking water system and sources. The state 
governments should release the matching grants on 1:1 basis. 
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• Up to 20 per cent of the fiinds can be utilized by state governments to take 
up projects under the sub-Mission programme for tackling water quality 
problems like excess fluoride, excess iron, arsenic, brackishness etc. and 
to ensure source sustainability by conserving water, recharging aquifer 
etc. Out of 20 per cent funds, 15 per cent of the funds is allocated for 
water quality projects and 5 per cent of the funds for sustainability of 
sources. Funding is done in the ratio of 75:25 between central and state 
governments. 
• 20 per cent of the annual outlay of ARWSP has been earmarked for 
implementation of swajaldhara and sector reform projects. The funding 
pattern for these projects is 90 per cent from government of India and 10 
per cent by way of community contributions. 
• About 5 per cent of the annual allocation is also earmarked to the states 
covered by DDP under ARWSP. For DDP districts, 100 per cent central 
grant is allocated to the states. 
• Further 5 per cent of ARWSP allocation earmarked to meet the 
contingencies arising due to natural calamities and emergent situation. For 
this 100 per cent grant is provided by the central government. 
V.2.3.5 Role of Panehayats 
As per the 13'^^ Amendment to the Constitution of India, the subject of 
rural water supply vests with PRIs. The PRIs are playing a pivotal role in 
providing safe drinking water and managing the water system in rural areas. 
They are also involving in implementation of schemes, particularly, in selecting 
the location of hand pumps, stand posts and spot sources, m operation and 
maintenance. The Government of India has laid emphasis on empowering and 
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capacity building of the PRIs to enable them discharge their responsibilities in 
drinking water supply. 
V.2.3.6 Financial Progress and Physical Progress 
The Central allocation of ftmds for rural water supply (ARWSP) has been 
stepped up from 2,110.00 crore in 2002-03 to 4,560.00 crore in 2006-07. 
Table 5.4 
Year-Wise Financial and Physical Progress of ARWSP 
(Rs. Cr.) 
Year 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Total] 0* Plan 
ARWSP 
Allocation 
2,110.00 
2,565.01 
2,900.00 
4,060.00 
4,560.00 
16,195.01 
Release 
2,100.70 
2,564.90 
2,930.79 
4,098.03 
4,560.00 
16,254.43 
State share 
Provision 
2,698.46 
2,821.52 
3,380.19 
3,931.05 
5,150.46 
17,981.68 
Expenditure 
2,395.65 
2,488.06 
2,971.52 
3,165.26 
4,192.23 
15,212.72 
Source : Annual Report, 2007-08, Ministry of Rural Development, GOI. 
For 11* Plan, tentatively Rs. 39,490 crore has been allocated for rural 
water supply out of which Rs, 6,500 crore has been provided in 2007-08. A 
sum of Rs, 4,522,49 crore has been utilized till December, 2007. 
Table 5.5 
Number of Habitations (Target and Achievement) under ARWSP 
Year 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Total 
Target 
63,869 
1,11,051 
74,868 
56,270 
73,120 
3,79,178 
Achievement 
39,250 
39736 
69,639 
97,215 
1,07,350 
3,53,190 
Source : Annual Report (2007-08), Ministry of Rural Development, Government of 
India. 
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Keeping in view the progress in last two years, during 2007-08, 1.55 lakh 
habitations are planned to be covered and addressed for water quality problem. 
As per information received from states/UTs, during 2007-08 till December 
2007, 5,038 uncovered and 36,387 sUpped-back habitations have been covered 
and 45,833 quality affected habitations have been reported to be addressed. 
Thus out of 1.55 lakh habitations to be covered/addressed in 2007-08, till 
December 2007, 87,258 habitations have been covered/addressed. 
V.2.3.7 Bharat Nirman 
Under Bharat Nirman for rural water supply, in 2005 it was envisaged that 
about Rs. 25,300 crore would be required in 4 years out of which, Rs. 4,098 
crore in 2005-06 and Rs. 4,560 crore in 2006-07 have been provided. In 2007-
08, Rs. 6,500 crore has been provided in the budget, out of which an 
expenditure of Rs. 4522,49 crore has been incurred by December 2007. 
V.2.2.8 Policy Initiatives 
While drafting the Eleventh Plan document and the policy which will 
guide the Department for the period 2007-08 to 2011-12, it was decided that 
the major issues which need tackling during this period are the problem of 
sustainability, water availability and supply, poor water quality, centralized vs. 
decentraUzed approaches and financing the 0 & M costs on equitable basis 
with fiill consideration to ensuring equity in regard to gender, socially and 
economically weaker sections of the society, school children, socially 
vulnerable groups such as pregnant and lactating mothers, specially abled and 
senior citizens etc. 
• Approval of Cabinet for shifting the focus from mere coverage of 
habitations to imiversal access of rural people to safe drinking water. 
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• Enhancing the funds under "Sustainability of drinking water supply 
schemes" from 5% on 75:25 sharing between Centre and State to 20% of 
the total RWS funds provided to States with 100% Central assistance. 
• Creation of State Technical Agency for ensuring sustainability of projects. 
• Approval of Cabinet obtained for providing Standalone drinking water 
purification systems in rural schools for improving the consumption point 
drinking water quality. 
• Preparation of guidelines on "Sajal Gram Puraskar" award to Panchayats 
who have achieved the distinction of sustainable drmking water supply 
and have controlled water borne diseases during the last 3 years. To 
become eligible for this award, the Panchayats have to achieve the 
"Nirmal Gram Puraskar" ensuring that the village is clean and there is no 
open defecation practice. 
• Technical experts will expertise in ground-water recharge, surface water 
collection and roof-water harvesting have been identified for attending the 
State level Scheme Sanctioning Committee and assisting the States in 
preparmg scrutinizing projects for building the sustainability element into 
every project.^ "* 
V.2.4 Rural Sanitation 
The concept of sanitation connotes a comprehensive definition, which 
includes liquid and solid waste disposal, food and personal hygiene and 
domestic as well as environmental hygiene. It is a way of life that is expressed 
in quality of life in all activities of human bemg. Although the concept of 
sanitation has undergone qualitative changes during the years, there has hardly 
been significant change in the sanitary condition in villages in India. 
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According to-the 2001 census data, only 21.9 per cent of the rural 
population in India had access to latrines. Inadequate sanitation has been a 
major cause for many diseases in developing countries such as India. Low 
awareness of the potential health and economic benefits of better sanitation and 
hygiene practices, perception of high costs of having a household toilet, the 
perceived convenience of open defecation and inadequate involvement of local 
self-governments and communities have kept the sanitation status low. .25 
V.2.4.1 Sanitation Policy of India 
India's first nationwide programme for rural sanitation, the Central Rural 
Sanitation Programme (CRSP), was launched in 1986 in the Ministry of Rural 
Development with the objective of improving the quality of life of rural people 
and to provide privacy and dignity to women. The programme provide a large 
subsidy for construction of sanitary latrines for BPL households. The 
programme was supply-driven, highly subsidized, and gave emphasis on a 
single construction model. Based on the recommendations of the National 
Seminar on Rural Sanitation in September 1992, the programme was again 
revised. The revised programme aimed at an integrated approach to rural 
sanitation. The Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC) under the restructured CRSP 
was launched with effect from 1.4.1999 following a community led and people 
centered approach. TSC moved away firom the principle of state-wise 
allocation to a "demand-driven" approach. The programme gives emphasis on 
Information, Education and Communication (lEC) for demand generation of 
sanitation facilities. It also lays emphasis on school sanitation and hygiene 
education for bringing about attitudinal and behavioural changes for relevant 
sanitation and hygiene practices from an early age. 
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V.2.4.2 Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC) 
The Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC) follows a community-led and 
people-centered approach. The programme gives emphasis on Information, 
Education and Communication (lEC) for demand generation for sanitation 
facilities. It also gives emphasis on school sanitation and hygiene education for 
changing the behaviour of the people from a young age and seek to attain Goal 
of the MDG by 2010 and "Sanitation for All by 2012". The components of 
TSC include start-up activities, lEC, Individual household latrines, community 
sanitary complex, school sanitation and hygiene education, Anganwadi toilets 
and Alternate delivery mechanisms, in the form of Rural Sanitary marts and 
Production centers. The component of Solid/Liquid Waste disposal in villages 
was included in TSC projects in 2006, providing 10% of each district project 
cost. Segregation of degradable and non-degradable solid waste, black and grey 
liquid wastewater and holistic environmental protection and cleanliness 
through rural sanitation, solid and liquid waste programmes are being taken up. 
V.2.4.3 Physical Progress 
As on December, 2007, 578 projects in the country are under implementation. 
The main physical components sanctioned in the 578 projects to be achieved 
over a period of 4-5 years are as follows : 
• Construction of 569.53 lakh individual household latrines for BPL 
families; 
• Construction of 614.97 lakh individual household latrines for APL 
families; 
• 11.21 lakh toilets unit for schools; 
• 4.11 lakh toilets for Balwadis/Anganwadis; 
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• 27,661 community sanitary complexes; 
• 4,248 Rural Sanitary Marts/Production centres 
Table 5.6 
Year-Wise Physical Progress of Total Sanitation Campaign 
Year 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Total 
IHHL 
BPL 
638660 
662130 
5566528 
2737178 
4161145 
4800192 
3750474 
22327307 
IHHL 
APL 
0 
0 
620350 
1716690 
5650437 
5093124 
3285878 
16366479 
Total 
IHHL 
638660 
662130 
6197878 
4453868 
9811582 
9893316 
7036352 
38693786 
School 
toilets 
10210 
11197 
66230 
55236 
88109 
131952 
128757 
491691 
Sanitary 
complex 
512 
428 
1580 
1623 
2880 
3018 
1881 
11922 
Balwadi 
toilets 
674 
979 
9589 
10531 
36074 
53179 
44481 
1550607 
Note : Data as on 31.12.2007 
Source : Annual Report, 2002-08, 
India. 
Ministry of Rural Development, Government of 
About 223.31 lakh household toilets for BPL and 163.67 lakh for APL 
have been constructed with support from the TSC. Besides, 4.92 lakh school 
toilets, 1.55 lakh anganvi^ adi toilets, 11,922 community complexs, and 7,531 
production centers/rural sanitary marts (RSMs) have been set up. 
V.2.4.4 Financial Progress 
Table 5.7 
Year-Wise Financial Performance of TSC (Rs. in crore) 
Year 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Total 
Allocation 
165.00 
165.00 
400.00 
700.08 
740.00 
1060.00 
3230 
Release 
141.10 
205.00 
367.66 
657.48 
737.91 
613.26 
2722.41 
Source: Annual Report, 2007-08, Ministry of Rural Development, 
Government of India """' 
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As on today, Total Sanitation Campaign Programme (TSC) projects 
have been sanctioned in 590 rural districts of the country at a total outlay of Rs. 
14,014 crore, with a Central share of Rs. 8,823 crore. The Central outlay for the 
Eleventh Plan has been approved at Rs. 7,816 crore for the Total Sanitation 
Campaign, including Rs. 1100 crore for the Nirmal Gram Puraskar. The annual 
budgetary support was increased from Rs. 202 crore in 2003-04 to Rs. 1,200 
crore in 2008-09. 
As per Census 2001 data, only about 21.9% of the rural families had 
access to toilets. The percentage has gone up to 49% as per the latest available 
figure, which is mainly attributed to the new strategies adopted under the 
TSC.^ ^ 
V.2.4.5 Nirmal Gram Puraskar (NGP) 
To encourage the panchayati raj institutions to take up sanitation 
promotion, the incentive scheme of Nirmal Gram Puraskar (NGP) has been 
launched. The award is given to those PRIs which attain 100% open defecation 
free environment. Each gram panchayat getting the NGP has a ripple effect in 
the surrounding villages, a movement sustained by active people's 
participation. Reward for a village is based on population size. The reward 
amount ranges from Rs. 0.50 lakh to 5 lakh along with memento and citation is 
given to gram panchayats which achieve 100% sanitation and clean 
environment in their villages. The numbers of NGP awards have increased 
dramatically, it was 38 in the year 2005, 760 in the year 2006, 4945 in the year 
2007 and 12075 in the year 2008.^ ^ 
V.2.4.6 Policy initiatives and restructuring of TSC: 
Under the TSC, the Central Government has increased the unit cost for 
construction of latrines to Rs. 2500, from the existing ^^. 1500. This is the 
• 
• 
• 
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second increase made by this Govt, since 2004. In 2004, the unit cost was 
only Rs. 625, which was increased to Rs. 1500 in 2006. This increase has 
been made without burdening the beneficiary, who will continue to pay 
only Rs. 300. The incentive now to be provided by the Centre to BPL 
households has been increased from Rs. 900.00 to Rs. 1500.00, 
Community contributions for construction of school and Anganwadi 
toilets have been removed and Centre and State share is fixed at 70:30 
ratio. 
The component of Solid/Liquid Waste disposal in villages was included in 
TSC projects in 2006, providing 10% of each district's project cost for 
this purpose. 
In order to promote sanitation among APL households who do not get 
incentives under TSC, a revolving fund of Rs. 50 lakh subject to a ceiling 
of 5% of total cost to each district has been earmarked for giving loan to 
APL members of self-help groups/cooperative societies for construction 
of latrines. 
The sanitation progrmame also aims to provide urinals and toilets in all 
schools and in all Anganwadis by March 2009, market places and all 
places of public access in the 11'^  Plan period. 
• It has been targeted to achieve total sanitation in all rural areas of the 
country by 2012. 
V.2.5 Rural Electrification 
Electricity has become one of the basic human needs and it has now been 
accepted that every household must have access to electricity. A positive co-
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relation exists between use of electricity and improvement in human 
development parameters of health and education. The electrification of rural 
households would not only provide better living conditions but shall also go a 
long way in eradication of unemployment amongst rural masses. In rural India, 
reliable and quality supply of electricity is necessary for broad based economic 
and human development going beyond increasing agricultural production 
through irrigation. 
Till 1947, only 1500 villages were electrified and per capita consumption 
of electricity was only 14 kwh. After independence the number of electrified 
villages increased to 474,982 and per capita consumption of electricity shot up 
to 582 kwh in 2004. As per 2001 census, out of about 138 million rural 
households, about 44 per cent households use electricity as a source of lighting, 
1,25,000 villages remained uncovered. The Ministry of Power has the 
responsibility of providing electricity to the remaining 1,25,000 villages 
through the programme instrument of Rajiv Gandhi Gramin Vidyutikaran 
Yojana. In addition it will also provide 23 million households with electricity. 
V.2.5.1 Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidhyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) 
The Central Government launched a scheme Rajiv Gandhi Grameen 
Vidhyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) in April, 2005 with the goal of electrifying all 
unelectrified villages and hamlets and providing access to electricity to all 
households in the next five years for fulfilhnent of the National Common 
Minimum Programme (NCMP). The scheme provides the free electricity 
connections to below poverty line (BPL) households. Rural Electrification 
Corporation (REC) is the nodal agency and the management of rural 
138 
distribution has been envisaged through franchisees who could be non 
governmental organizations (NGOs), users' associations, cooperatives or 
individual entrepreneurs. Panchayat institutions would be associated with the 
management. 
V.2.5.2 Finances 
90% capital subsidy will be provided for overall cost of the projects under 
the scheme. The capital subsidy for eligible projects under the scheme will be 
through the rural Electrification Corporation Limited, which will be the nodal 
agency. Electrification of unelectrified below-poverty line households will be 
financed with 100% capital subsidy at Rs. 1500 per connection in all rural 
habitations. Others will be paying for the connections at prescribed connection 
charges and no subsidy will be made available. 
The Government has approved the continuation of the RGGVY during 
the Eleventh Five Year Plan period with an initial outlay of Rs.28,000 crore 
with an envisaged coverage in Phase-1 of about 1.15 lakh unelectified villages 
and 2.34 crore rural BPL households. A three-tier quality control mechanism 
under RGGVY is being set up at the State, REC and the Ministry of Power 
level with random inspections by independent agencies. 
V.2.5.3 Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidhyutikaran Yojana Progress: 
• 27 States and their utilities have signed the memorandum of agreement 
agreeing to the conditionalities for implementation of the programme as 
envisaged under RGGVY. 
• Four CPSUs-Power Grid Corporation India Ltd (PGCIL), National 
Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), National Hydroelectric Power 
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Corporation (NHPC), Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) have been 
allocated 139 Districts for implementation of RGGVY. 
• At present 235 projects are under implementation covering 67,012 
unelectrified villages and 83.1 lakh BPL households at the awarded cost 
of Rs. 12386.03 crore. 
• 45,430 villages have been electrified and 18,25,508 connections to BPL 
households have been released. 
• Franchisees are in place in 73,422 villages in 14 States. 
V.3 Others Development Programmes 
There are many other programmes which are directly or indirectly related 
to the rural infrastructure development. These programmes do have a 
significant impact on the living condition of the rural people: 
V.3.1 National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme: NREGS, which 
was launched on February 2, 2006, in 200 most backward Districts in the first 
phase, has been expanded to 330 Districts in second phase and remaining 266 
Districts have been notified on September 28, 2007 where the scheme will 
come in to effect from April 1, 2008. It is the flagship programme of the 
Government that directly touches lives of the poor and promotes inclusive 
growth. The scheme aims at enhancing livelihood security of households in 
rural areas of the country by providing at least one hundred days of guaranteed 
wage employment in a financial year to every household whose adult members 
volunteer to do unskilled manual work. 
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As against the employment demanded by 2.61 crore rural households, 
2.57 households have been provided wage employment during 2007-08. A 
budget allocation of Rs.12,000 crore was made for 2007-08 and Rs.10,501.02 
crore has been released till Jan 1, 2008. 
V.3.2 Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana: The Swamjayanti Gram 
Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) was launched in April 1999 after restructuring the 
Integrated Rural development Programme (IRDP) and allied programme. It is 
the only self employment programme currently being implemented for the rural 
poor. The objective of the SGSY is to bring the assisted swarozgaris above the 
poverty line by providing them income generating assets through bank credit 
and Government subsidy. The scheme is being implemented on cost sharmg 
basis of 75:25 between the Centre and States. Up to December 2007, 27.37 
lakh self-help groups (SHGs) have been formed and 93.21 lakh swarozgaris 
have been assisted with a total outlay of Rs. 19,340.32 crore. 
V.3.3 Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (SGRY): The Sampooma 
Grameen Rozgar Yojana was launched on September, 2001. The objective of 
the programme is to provide additional wage employment in the rural areas as 
also food security, alongside creation of durable community, social and 
economic infrastructure in the rural areas. In 2007-08 up to December 31, 
2007, the number of person-days of employment generated under SGRY was 
11.60 crore while the Centre's contribution in term of cash and foodgrain 
component up to December 31, 2007, were Rs.1,1142.27 crore and 9.55 lakh 
tonne, respectively. Under the special component, about 0.55 lakh tonnes of 
foodgrain have been released to calamity hill States in the current year up to 
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December 2007. SGRY programme in 330 districts has already been subsumed 
in National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. SGRY programme wilTbe 
29 entirely subsumed in NREGS with effect from April 1,2008. 
V.3.4 National Rural Health Mission (NRHM): The National Rural 
Health Mission was launched on April 12, 2005, to provide accessible, 
affordable and accountable quality health services to the poorest households in 
the remotest regions. Allocation increased to Rs.9,947 crore in 2007-08 from 
Rs.8,207 crore in the previous year. 
V.3.5 Mid-day Meal Scheme: This scheme, which was launched in August 
1995, is intended to give boost to universalization of primary education by 
increasing enrolment, retention and attendance while contributing to the 
nutrition of students in primary classes. The allocation has been enhanced to 
Rs.7,324 crore in 2007-08 from Rs.5,348 crore in 2006-07. 
V.3.6 Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA): The Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) is 
being implemented in partnership with States to address the needs of children 
in age group of 6-14 years. The achievement under SSA up to September, 
2007, include construction of 1,70,320 school buildings, construction of 
7,13,179 additional classrooms, 1,72,381 drinking water facilities, construction 
of 2,18,075 toilets, supply of free textbooks to 6.64 crore children and 
appointment of 8.10 lakh teachers besides opening of 1,86,985 (till March, 
2007) new schools. About 35 lakh teachers receive in-service training each 
year. Central allocation for SSA in 2007-08 was Rs. 10,671. With significant 
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success in enrolling children in schools, the SSA's thrust areas are on reduction 
of dropouts and improving quality of student learning. 
i t . 
In order to operationalize the Action Point of the Round Tables on 29 
June, 2004, one of the main tasks of the Ministry of Panchayati Raj is to ensure 
the Central Government programmes and schemes, including those on 
infrastructure development, are compatible with the letter and spirit of the 
Constitutional provisions relating to panchayats. The focus is on the policies 
that govern the transfer of ftinds to States through Centrally Sponsored 
Schemes (CSSs). The approach is to articulate the viewpoint of the panchayats 
to all Ministries and other bodies, such as the Planning Commission, which 
have a critical role to play in the transformation of schemes to become 
compatible with panchayats. The current debate on the reform of CSSs is quite 
different from those that preceded it, because no longer are we considering 
reforming them in the context of the centre and the States alone, but are joined 
by the panchayats too as important stakeholders in them. '^ 
V.4 Generic Features of Well Designed Panchayati Raj System 
Reform of fiscal transfers and guidelines of infrastructure programmes 
have to conform with what are recognized to be elements of good institutional 
design for local body functioning. There are pillars on which good design rests, 
namely, designing, planning, and implementation- system, system for good 
accountability, transparency, capacity building and training. 
V.4.1 Designing, Planning and Implementation System 
The first imperative in designing, planning and implementation systems 
involving multiple levels of government is to ensure role clarity. Assigning 
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clearly defined activities to each level of government is essential both for 
efficient delivery of services as also for people to hold these levels accountable 
for their performance. When local goverrmients are assigned clear tasks, 
devolved funds and made accountable for their performance of these newly 
assigned responsibilities, they have a big incentive to demand the capacity 
required for effective performance. Thus role clarity catalyses capacity building 
from being supply driven to being demand driven. Empowered panchayats with 
clear roles assigned through activity mapping would also begin to demand the 
staff for effective performance. Therefore, activity mapping can spur 
appropriate placement of functionaries for better service delivery. 
Activity mapping of the three tiers of panchayats is the first step and this 
should be followed by identifying assignment of revenue sources and designing 
and implementing the transfer system to meet the requirement of the 
panchayats to carry out the functions devolved to them in an equitable and 
efficient manner. Activity mapping, identification of independent source of 
revenues and reforming the transfer system and building capacity of panchayats 
to efficiently implement their tax and expenditure policies constitute the core of 
local government reform in India. 
In the First Round Table of state Ministers of Panchayati Raj in Kolkata it 
was agreed that all states and UTs would undertake activity mapping by the 
end of 2004-5, using the activity mapping model that evolved in the Ministry of 
Rural Development in the Report of the Task Force on Devolution of Powers 
and Functions upon Panchayati Raj Institutions. Though this target has not 
been achieved in all states, there has been considerable progress on activity 
mapping with respect to each state. 
144 
V.4.2 System for Good Accountability 
The second cornerstone of good institutional design is to build systems for 
the accountability of these bodies, both upward to regulatory structures as also 
downwards to the people they serve. In this connection, the Round Tables of 
State Ministers of Panchayati Raj arrived at several action points that are being 
progressively implemented. These include strengthening the gram sabha, a 
good system of audit, no mismatch between functional assignments, and having 
a strong revenue base,''^  
V.4.3 Transparency 
Accountability and transparency are possible only if gram sabha are taken 
seriously. Empowerment of Gram Sabha require efforts at mobilization of the 
village community for mass participation in meetings of the Gram Sabha. 
Further, a massive awareness generation programme needs to be taken up to 
inform Gram Sabha about their right in planning, implementation and audit of 
development programmes and in control over natural resources, land records 
and conflict resolution. 
Te Union Government has since been working with State Governments to 
adopt the following procedures which would make PRIs in the country more 
transparent and accountable: 
• Activation of PRI Standing Committees so that decision-making is not 
concentrated in the hands of the head of the PRI concerned. 
• Activation of the Gram Sabha, preferably by statutorily endowing Gram 
Sabhas with the duty of : Approving all projects and programmes and 
plans of the Panchayat: Authorising the issue of utilization certificates by 
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the Panchayat bureaucracy; Formation of the Sub-Committees of the 
Gram Sabhas to liasise with the counterpart Standing Committees of the 
Panchayat; 
• The constitution of Ward Sabhas to facilitate participative social audit 
• The convening of Mahila Sabhas immediately prior to meetings of Ward 
Sabhas/Gram Sabhas. 
• Invokmg the Right to Information Act, and associatmg public-spirited 
NGOs, to help Gram Sabha to provide the checks and balances and 
furnish advice and consent to the elected executive authority.^ ^ 
V.4.4 Strengthening the Gram Sabha 
The gram sabha can be a powerful instrument of downward 
accountability, if properly empowered and convened regularly. Ideally 
speaking a good framework for empowerment of gram sabhas would be that at 
the minimum, it will have powers to approve plans, programmes, and projects 
before they are taken up for implementation by the panchayat at the village 
level. It would identify beneficiaries of poverty alleviation and other 
programmes and issue certification of utilization of funds by the panchayat at 
the village level for the above programmes. In the context of infrastructure 
development, this would also mean that gram sabhas have the power to 
undertake community contracting, both for construction of rural infrastructure 
projects and their maintenance. 
V.4.5 Capacity Building and Training/Gram Swaraj 
While hands-on capacity building and traming can come through greater 
empowerment of the Panchayats, formal capacity building and training 
146 
exercises are also important. Capacity building includes: Office space in a 
modular mode; Staffing commensurate with the responsibilities of the 
Panchayats; Connectivity, especially cyber connectivity, to promote IT-enabled 
e-govemance; rapid fund Village and village Knowledge Centres. 
The seventh Round Table at Jaipur in December 2004 detailed the steps 
to be taken for IT-enabled e-govemance in the Panchayats and Capacity 
Building/Training. The Ministry is formulating a scheme ("Gram Swaraj") to 
support States in capacity building and training for their Panchayats. 
V.4.6 A Backward Region Grant Fund 
A Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF) with an annual budget of about 
Rs. 5000 crore (Rs. 50 billion) has been formulated by the government to focus 
building physical and social infrastructure through on district planning as 
provided for in the Constitution. The Ministry of Panchayati Raj is 
administering this fund in which the centrality of the Panchayats in the 
planning and implementation of programmes through use of untied funds is of 
the essence. Effective district planning in backward regions will facilitate 
similarly effective district plarming in all districts in accordance with Planning 
Commission guidelines, 
V.4.7 Rural Business Hubs 
The Ministry has also undertaken a major initiative to promote Rural 
Business Hubs (RBH)s through the establishment of a governance relationship 
between business enterprises and PRIs to promote at least one Rural Business 
Hub in each development block of the country. The Ministry has identified 
some 850 blocks and their local resource endowments. Some 55 Memoranda of 
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Understanding have been entered into by business enterprises with PRIs in 
diverse fields. 
Decentralization in planning and implementation of programmes, based 
on the principle of subsidiarity, is an essential supplement to enhance resource 
flow in achieving balanced regional development and participation and 
empowerment of the poor. Pursuing a participatory growth strategy not only 
makes the ensuruig growth acceptable at the grass-roots level, it fosters 
capacity building for sustainable growth at different tiers of local self-
governments. But despite the clear Constitutional directions handed out 
through 13''^ Amendments, there are wide inter-state variations in the degree of 
effective decentralization achieved. The success of decentralized programme 
implementation depends on effective transfer of function, functionaries and 
finances to local self-governments. Functions have not always been fiilly 
transferred. Even where the functions have been transferred, functionaries and 
fiinctions have remamed under the control of higher level of government. 
Fiscal decentralization, in terms of resource mobilization and strengthening the 
revenue-expenditure link remains weak. Thus any serious attempt to improve 
the fiscal autonomy of the panchayats should ensure greater tax power to them. 
There is considerable need to rationalize the assignment system to enable the 
decentralized governments to raise revenues and incur expenditure according to 
the preference of their citizens. It is necessary to understand the policies and 
institutions necessary for the success to make the local fiscal governance 
successful. 
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CHAPTER-VI 
SUMMARY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
There is widespread acceptance of the view that decentralization of 
expenditure responsibilities to lower tier governments is efficiency augmenting 
sub-national governments are better informed and can more readily respond to 
the needs and preferences of the citizens living in their jurisdictions. 
Decentralized governance require active participation of people in development 
planning, implementation and monitoring of development programmes. 
Therefore the development administration particularly rural development 
programmes and schemes call for re-orientation and re-thinking m the changed 
environment of governance. The imperatives of decentralized planning in India 
have been emphasized during the plan periods, however the progress in this 
direction remamed slow despite repeated change in policy prescriptions. 
In the context of l^^ and lA^ Amendment Acts, local bodies have 
acquired a new meaning and significance. The state governments were requbed 
to bring conformity legislation and clearly specify the responsibilities of the 
local bodies and the resources assigned to them. The revenue of local 
government in each state are to be determined by the State Finance 
Commission with a periodicity of five years. The Central Finance Commission 
was also required to look mto the issues of the governance at the level of third-
tier and in particular suggest ways and means by which the resources of the 
states can be augmented with the explicit objective of strengthening the 
finances of their local bodies. However, the State Finance Commission are 
facing challenges in terms of devolution of fimction and finance to rural local 
bodies. 
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The revenue accruals to the rural local bodies is not adequate to enable 
them to effectively deliver the required standards of public services. There is 
considerable need to rationaUze the assignment system to enable the 
decentralized governments to raise revenue and incur expenditure according to 
the preference of their citizens. It is necessary to understand the policies 
according to the preferences of their citizens. It is necessary to understand the 
policies and institutions necessary for the success to make the local fiscal 
governance successful. 
A salient feature of fiscal federalism in India has resulted in a significant 
degree of vertical fiscal imbalance. The wide differences in per capita incomes 
among the states have also caused severe horizontal fiscal imbalances. The 
transfer system should offset the fiscal imbalances. But multiple transfer 
channels sometimes work at cross purposes, creating serious problems of 
focusing the transfers on fiscally disadvantaged states. The methodology 
adopted by the Finance Commission transfers that of filling the gaps between 
projected revenues and expenditures - has not only created serious 
disincentives, but also results in inequity. The system does not attempt 
significant equalization, as projections of expenditure for poorer states are 
made from a low base. As the projected gaps are filled through transfers, 
disincentives are created for tax effort and expenditure economy. The 
distinction made between plan and non-plan transfers also has segmented the 
budget with adverse consequences on fiscal management. These problems have 
significantly politicized the transfer system. It is therefore necessary to 
redesign the transfer system to improve accountability, incentives and equity. 
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With the 73'"* and 74^ Constitutional Amendments, the democratic base 
of decentralized governance has widened and the scope for functional and 
financial devolution to panchayats has been ensured through mandatory 
provisions. The panchayts have been empowered to raise their resources in 
order to enable them to discharge the functions assigned to them. It has been 
observed that the powers and functions which have been assigned to panchayati 
raj institutions are overlapping in areas, functions and responsibilities between 
the three tiers of panchayati raj institutions. The type of functions assigned to 
any tier of panchayati raj institutions is ambiguous. Often the same function is 
performed by two or three different tiers of panchayati raj institutions. There 
exists overlapping of ftinctions between different official agencies, for example 
District Rural Development Agency (DRDA), District Development Council 
(DDC), District Planning Committee (DDC) etc. which are assigned the same 
function under the schemes of rural development. Importantly, there are no 
principle or criteria adopted for the assignment of responsibilities to the 
different tiers of panchayats. Functions have not always been fully transferred. 
Even where the functions have been transferred, functionaries and functions 
have remained under the control of higher level of government. 
Notwithstanding the Constitutional Amendments and the relevant statutory 
provisions, there is neither "political will" nor "administrative will", to 
strengthen the PRIs in several states. 
There is no uniform pattern for levying taxes and user charges by 
panchayati raj institutions in India. Therefore, the income of PRIs varies from 
state to state. It is interesting to note here that most of the taxes and user 
charged are being levied only at grampanchayat level and very few taxes and 
user charges are being levied at panchayat samiti or zila parishad. Most of the 
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taxes are economically less productive or politically less feasible or 
administratively cumbersome. Moreover, a few important local taxes have been 
withdrawn from the fiscal domain of the local governments on grounds of 
relative inefficiency of the latter, and are being administered by the state 
governments in a few states. Though compensation payments through the 
mechanism of grant-in-aid are evolved in this regard by the state governments, 
the quantum of resources transfers is not commensurate with the productive 
revenue yield of these taxes. Moreover, revenue transfers in the form of grants 
from the states to the local governments are characterized by inadequacy and 
uncertainty. 
It may be observed by the trend analysis of income and expenditure of 
PRIs, that there is a huge variation in the composition of own revenue sources 
of panchayati raj institutions across the states in India. The growth of 
expenditure has been found comparatively higher than the growth of income of 
panchayati raj institutions. The share of own revenue to total income of 
panchayats has been found to be meager and therefore the panchayats have to 
depend upon state governments for financial devolution to meet out the 
emerging fiscal needs and fulfilling the committed liabilities. 
The experience shows that the states are not bothered to take action on 
the state Finance Commission reports. This is against the spirit of constitutional 
provision. The State finance Commission reports in general also paid far less 
attention to issue of autonomy, financial management and auditing procedures. 
The main deficiency of the reports lies in the fact that the recommendations are 
not based on a clear statement of the spending responsibilities of local bodies. 
The reports are deficient on linkages between devolution of funds to local 
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governments and their responsibilities. Instead of leading to improvement of 
fiscal base at the local level, the SFCs have left the existing tax powers of local 
bodies unchanged. There is no proper fiscal information system at the state 
level. The Central Finance Commission provision for PRIs of Rs. 1000 crore 
per year was independent of SFC recommendations. The Twelfth Finance 
Commission inclusion of a deprivation index and additional weightage to 
revenue effort of the local bodies in formula for determining state share is 
claimed as an incentives for both performing and poor states. But the 
overwhelming weight given to population embodies an incentives structure that 
merely rewards states that have failed to control population growth. The poor 
performance of Planning Commission in our country in terms of financing the 
plans, administrative constraints have also resulted in a situation where we 
could not achieve the stipulated plan target. There are more than 200 centrally 
sponsored schemes, involving about Rs. 80000 crore per annum, given either as 
grants, loans or other contribution by the Plannmg Commission to the states for 
implementing programmes. But CSSs implemented by other Central Ministries, 
often ignore the involvement of PRIs. In case the role is identified, it is either 
non-existent or minimal. 
It is also been observed that corruption at local level, poor quality of 
accounting and delayed auditing, lack of synchronization of the findings of 
CFC and SFC reports are some serious issues before the 13''* Finance 
Commission while making recommendation for local bodies. 
Even after the six decades of independence and development planning, 
the rural population in India does not find themselves in the mainstream of 
development across the country. The livelihood indicators of our rural areas are 
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lower than even some of our neighbouring countries. The basic issues of roads, 
electricity, water supply, sanitation, comparable quality of education, 
employment and overall quality of life remain a serious consideration in 
policies and programmes of national, state and local self governments. 
Programmes like the Bharat Nirman, PMGSY, SSA, NREGS, lAY, TSC and 
NRHM have been launched with substantial funding. But much of the 
significant performance gaps in the policy planning and implementation are 
owing to the poor participation of the people at the grass root level in the rural 
areas, in planning, projects management and unplementation. The transparency 
and accountability norms are hazy. The output and 'outcome' of these schemes 
with waste expenditure have been poor. 
A package of policy recommendations has been suggested in this part of 
the dissertation to mobilize financial resources of panchayats and to enable 
them for smooth functioning and governance. There is an imperative need for 
introducing the concept of planning in rural development programmes more 
vigorously. The local policies and development priorities should be based on 
local needs and requirements. 
Recommendations 
• The State Government should make provisions to suggest the Panchayats 
regarding the documentation and maintenance of accounts of the work 
assigned to them and best Panchayats should be brought into notice as 
successful story and be given special awards. It will generate competition 
among the Panchayats for better performance. 
• Data base related to finances of local bodies should also be ensured in 
each district to maintain the accounts in the given format and also to 
• 
• 
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assess the financial resources of Panchayats either at the block level oral 
the Tehsil level. 
For effective and smooth functioning, and to generate more resources at 
Gram Panchayat level, imparting of training to the newly elected 
representatives and development, functionaries should be ensured. Such 
type of training should be based on proper assessment of training needs 
and suitably design training package. The package should also include 
leadership and entrepreneurship .skill, administration of development 
programmes, functioning of Panchayati Raj Institutions and Panchayat 
finances. In this context, the role of opinion leaders, NGOs, SHGs, and 
farmers/ women association through financial support, encouragement, 
and strengthening should be entrusted. 
A clear demarcation of schemes and programmes would reduce the 
overlapping among Panchayati Raj Institutions and rural development 
departments. Moreover, clear-cut criteria should be evolved for 
devolution of powers and functions to the Panchayati Raj Institutions. 
• Parallel bodies like DRDAs and others should be merged with the district 
panchayats. Special programme like Janmabhoomi and others should be 
implemented by PRIs. Given the technical nature of the functions, it is 
necessary to co-opt expert and NGOs into DPCs. 
• MPs and MLAs area development funds should be placed at the disposal 
of DPCs and it should be spent with the concurrence of DPCs. 
• There is a need to insist the state governments to hold regular and free 
elections of the three tiers of panchayats, to devolve power and functions 
to PRIs and to abolish parallel bodies. 
• 
• 
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There is an imperative need of presenting the district budget separately 
before the state legislature to fulfill the objective of fiscal autonomy. A 
completely separate framing of a district level budget would surely be the 
ideal method, in the context of decentralized planning, of ensuring the 
desired representativeness of elected Zila Parishad. 
The Gram Sabha should has full powers for determining the priorities for 
various programmes in the village and approval of budget. Prior approval 
of Gram Sabha should be made mandatory for taking up programmes and 
anticipation of expenditure. 
The concept and philosophy of decentralized planning does not mean that 
Panchayats should be given a free hand to spend money or utilize 
resources. The Panchayats should be given enough scope/ liberty to 
generate their own resources to meet the financial requirements. As far as 
utilization of financial resources is concerned, undoubtedly the process of 
strategic management encompassing planning, programming, budgeting, 
recording, reportiilg and finally evaluating is required to be .rigorously 
implemented. Importantly, the district authorities are required to adopt a 
zero base concept of budgeting without having any kind of prior 
commitment to accommodate on going programmes and schemes. 
• House tax is one of the main sources of income for the PWs. This should 
be simplified and rationalized. Exemptions from property tax should be 
minimized. Taxes which are local in nature, such as entertainment tax, 
professional tax, stamp duty, land revenue, etc. should either be 
transferred to panchayats or a reasonable share of it be given to these local 
bodies. 
• 
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The Panchayats should exploit potentially the emerging markets such as 
festivals, social functions, haats, fairs, retailing etc. through imposing 
taxes and user charges. The Panchayats can ensure rendering of necessary 
services such as sanitation, public safety, transportation, storage, 
marketmg yards, lightmg etc. for user charges. 
Land revenue on agriculture land should be levied effectively in each 
state. The Panchayats should be granted full rights to have access to land 
records. Special efforts should be made to diversify agriculture and to 
promote non-farm sector to increase the land revenue base of the 
Panchayats. Agricultural taxes for commercialization of crops and allied 
agricultural activities may be imposed effectively and an. appropriate 
mechanism may be evolved out for realization of such taxes. 
Sharing of taxes in sale of goods and commodities, purchase or 
registration of goods consumed in rural areas, consumer durables and 
other property base taxes should be made statutorily. 
The revenue base of Panchayats should be strengthened by giving more 
autonomy for raising resources and allowing to take market borrowings 
and also sharing in royalities collected by the state goverrmient such as 
minor minerals, quarried materials and forest revenues. 
There should be re-orientation of financial system for self-regulating and 
accountability, transparency and responsibility may be ensured in the 
Panchayati Raj system. Interestingly, Panchayati Raj Institutions should 
be given more autonomy for raising resources to finance developmental 
projects and programmes. 
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• To improve the quality of civic services and maintenance of the 
infrastructure, there should be more allocation of funds on core services. 
A mechanism for resource allocation should be evolved by the 
government or district authority to ensure qualitative change in the 
delivery of social services. 
• We should adopt fiscal needs approach to assess the functional and 
financial mismatch of the states. Fiscal needs cannot be simply estimated 
on the basis of projected budgetary figures. It is essential to find out the 
physical flow of goods and services corresponding to financial flow of 
goods and services. In the context of fiscal federalism, the mechanism of 
resource transfers should be organically connected with the mismatch 
both physical as well as financial. 
State Finance Commissions should be given directions and guidelines for 
adopting uniform patterns in terms of the assessment of the fiscal needs of 
the local bodies, in using the criteria for fiscal devolution, resource 
allocation and its distribution. Thus, the recommendations made by State 
Finance Commissions may be critically reviewed to draw out inferences 
which will be useful for the policy formulation in terms of resource 
mobilization in a specific state or geographical locality. 
• Despite the differences in the area of operation of the Planning 
Commission and Finance Commission, the Finance Commission should 
take into account the recommendations of the Planning Commission while 
making its own projections and similarly the Planning Commission should 
also take into account the projections of the earlier Finance Commission. 
• 
• 
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The distinction between plan expenditure and non-plan expenditure may 
be justified from the point of view of accounting convenience but for 
purposes of policy formulation both plan and non-plan expenditure should 
be treated into totality. 
National Infrastructure Development ftmd (NIDF) could be established to 
extend loans and financial aid to both PRIs and ULBs for infrastructure 
development. 
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